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When it comes to punishment, should we be subjectivists or
objectivists? That is, should we define, measure, and justify
punishment based on the subjective experiences of those who are
punished or should we instead remain objective, focusing our
attention on acts, culpability, and desert? In a recent series of high-
profile articles, a group of contemporary scholars has taken up the
mantle of subjectivism. In their view, criminal punishment is a
grand machine for the production of negative subjective
experiences-suffering. The machine requires calibration, of course.
According to these scholars, the main standard we use for ours is
comparative proportionality. We generally punish more serious
crimes more severely and aim to inflict the same punishment on
similarly situated offenders who commit similar crimes. In the views
of these authors, this focus on comparative proportionality makes
ours a rather crude machine. In particular, it ignores the fact that
(1) different offenders suffer differently or to a different degree when
subjected to the same punishment; (2) different offenders have
different happiness baselines, which leads to disparities in the
degree of suffering among offenders sentenced to the same
punishment as measured by comparing their prepunishment
baselines to their hedonic states during punishment; and (3)
offenders' self-reported states of happiness and suffering vary over
the course of a sentence, revealing inaccuracies in our objective
assessments of severity.
These scholars contend that a more sophisticated and
rational approach would be to calibrate punishment according to the
amount of suffering produced, trading objective measures of
punishment-years in prison, etc.-for subjective measures. Looking
forward to a day when advances in neuroscience and psychology will
provide us with reliable qualitative and quantitative metrics of
suffering, these scholars are setting the stage now, arguing that no
matter our theory of criminal law and punishment-be we
retributivists or utilitarians-we are obliged to dial the machine
according to who is in its thrall and to titer both the form and extent
of punishment so as to achieve just the right kind and amount of
suffering.
This view of the criminal law may strike some readers as
troubling. It should. The problem can be traced to three contestable
propositions. The first is that "subjective disutility" is a necessary
feature and primary goal of punishment. The second is that
comparative proportionality serves as an independent measure of
justice in punishment. The third is that punishment theory must
justify all of the suffering caused by the punitive practices it
endorses. This Article rejects each of these claims. It defends
retributivist and utilitarian theories of punishment on objectivist
grounds by explaining why arguments based on the proposition that
punishment is suffering have no bite on these theories. These
arguments urge punishment theorists to reject outright the claim
that punishment should be calibrated according to the subjective
suffering it inflicts. So too do the uncomfortable outcomes
subjectivist critics deploy against objective theories of punishment as
purported reductio ad absurdum. While admittedly absurd, those
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I. INTRODUCTION
According to a critique of retributivism and some forms of
utilitarianism advanced by several contemporary scholars, criminal
punishment is a grand machine for the generation and administration
of "subjective disutility,"I principally in the form of suffering.2 The
machine requires calibration, of course. These critics claim that the
main standard we use for our machine is comparative proportionality. 3
We punish more serious crimes more severely and aim to inflict the
same punishment on similarly situated offenders who commit similar
crimes.4 In these critics' views, this focus on comparative
proportionality, when filtered through a subjectivist analysis of
punishment, reveals that ours is a rather crude machine. In
particular, it ignores the fact that (1) different offenders may suffer
differently or to a different degree when subjected to the same penal
sanction;5 (2) different offenders have different happiness baselines,
which lead to disparities in the degree of suffering among offenders
sentenced to the same punishment as measured by comparing their
1. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and
Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1037 (2009) ("When the state punishes a criminal, it
inflicts suffering."); Adam Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
182, 212-13 (2009) ("[T]he subjective disutility of punishment is not some mere aftereffect of
punishment. Rather, it is largely or entirely the punishment itself. Subjective disutility is a
necessary component of retributive punishment and constitutes, if not the sole reason for
retributive punishment, certainly a major part of it."). This Article argues the contrary. While
original, it is not alone. Among others, Dan Markel and Chad Flanders have taken a firm stand
against contemporary subjectivists. See Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts, 98
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
2. This Article uses "suffering" broadly to capture the range of subjective experiences
characterized as "negative" by those who experience them. "Suffering" so defined stretches well
beyond physical pain.
3. While usually credited to retributivist theories of punishment, proportionality is equally
a commitment of utilitarians. See, e.g., CESARE BECCARIA, OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 73-76
(Jane Grigson trans., Marsilio Publishers 1996) (1764). Kolber expresses deep reservations about
proportionality, as do Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur. See Kolber, supra note 1, at 185; see
also John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Retribution and the Experience
of Punishment, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1463, 1495-96 (2010). As is argued below, much of this discussion
is a consequence either of a confusion between objective proportionality and comparative
proportionality, or a mistake in attributing to the theorists they critique the view that
comparative proportionality is an independent principle when, in fact, it is wholly derivative of
objective proportionality. See infra Part IV.A.
4. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323-28 (1987) (discussing the principle of
treating similarly situated defendants the same).
5. See generally Kolber, supra note 1, at 235-36 (arguing that subjective experience
matters in assessments of punishment severity).
1620
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prepunishment baselines to their hedonic states during punishment;6
and (3) offenders' self-reported states of happiness and suffering vary
over the course of a sentence, revealing inaccuracies in our
assessments of both the amount of suffering inflicted and its
distribution over time.7
In contrast to scholars who endorse objective approaches to
punishment, subjectivists propose that a more sophisticated and
rational way to calibrate punishment would be according to the
negative experiences of those punished, measured either subjectively,8
comparatively,9 or diachronically. 10 Looking forward to a day when
sophisticated brain mapping techniques, pain studies, and other
advances in neuroscience and psychology will provide us with reliable
qualitative and quantitative metrics of happiness and suffering,"
these writers are setting the stage now, arguing that no matter our
theory of criminal law and punishment-be we retributivists or
utilitarians-we are obliged to adjust the machine according to who is
in its thrall and to titer both the form and extent of punishment so as
to achieve just the right amount of subjective disutility in each case. 12
By virtue of their focus on subjective experiences, these scholars may
fairly be labeled "subjectivists." As the term will be used here,
subjectivists maintain that punishment is, in whole or substantial
part, described, accounted for, and justified by the subjective
6. See generally Adam Kolber, The Comparative Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV.
1565, 1598 (2009) (arguing that we have to measure sentence severity by comparing offenders'
baseline and punished conditions).
7. See generally Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1037 ("[Nlew findings about human
adaptability unsettle the assumptions upon which the [penal] system rests. Specifically, people
adapt well to negative changes in wealth and even to many features of prison life . . . .").
8. See Kolber, supra note 1, at 236 (arguing that any successful justification of punishment
must take subjective experience into account).
9. See Kolber, supra note 6, at 1566 (arguing that in order to assess punishment severity
accurately we must compare an offender's life in prison relative to his life in his unpunished,
baseline condition).
10. See Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1054-55 (arguing that we would need to adjust our
approach to sentencing in order to create the levels of imposed harm we intend if adjustments in
the size of fines and the length of prison sentences do not affect the magnitude of the negative
experience of punishment in a linear fashion).
11. See Kolber, supra note 1, at 222-23 (noting that new technologies can be expected to
help in assessing a person's distress level); see also Adam Kolber, The Experiential Future of
Law, 60 EMORY L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (asserting that, in the future, we will have better
technologies to measure experiences such as physical pain, pain relief, emotional distress, and
anxiety).
12. See, e.g., Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1069 (arguing that punishment theory must
account for different individuals' experiences of punishment).
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experiences of those who are punished.13 The contrary view defended
here is objectivism, which holds that punishment should be described,
accounted for, and justified on objective grounds without reference to
the subjective experiences of particular offenders.
The subjectivist's view of the criminal law may strike some
readers as troubling, and so it should. Immanuel Kant long ago
warned against "crawl[ing] through the windings of eudaemonism"
when deciding whom to punish and what form punishment ought to
take.14 All the talk of subjective disutility, suffering, and happiness
engaged in by subjectivists smacks of precisely the reliance on hedonic
economies to answer normative questions that Kant railed against.
Nevertheless, subjectivists contend that even retributivists, who reject
on moral grounds attempts to calibrate punishment by reference to
subjective suffering, are obligated on pain of contradiction to look
forward to a day when sensors and algorithms will identify a
measurable and consistent intersubjective quantum of suffering and
thereby bring order, fairness, and reason to criminal law and
punishment. 15 The same is true, they conclude, for those classic
utilitarians who measure punishment on objective rather than
subjective grounds. 16
There is no doubt that these critiques, and the positive theories
of punishment they endorse explicitly or by implication, are
"provocative" and address "an underappreciated problem in criminal
law theory," namely, "[w]hat is the relevance of the criminal
defendant's subjective experience of punishment?" 7 Specifically, they
raise important questions for under-theorized areas of the criminal
law and practice, including the proper role of mercy and nettlesome
13. See, e.g., Kolber, supra note 1, at 212-13, 215-16, 218-19 (arguing that any successful
justification of punishment must take the subjective experience into account).
14. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 105 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996) (1785).
15. See Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1068-73 (arguing that a necessary precondition to
operationalizing the retributive theory is an understanding of the manner and degree to which
fines and imprisonment actually negatively affect those who receive them); Kolber, supra note 6,
at 1595-97 (arguing that we must recognize the subjective severity of an offender's punishment
in order to adequately justify their punishment); Kolber, supra note 1, at 236 (arguing that
retributivists should recognize that subjective experience matters in assessments of punishment
severity and should take steps toward better calibrating punishment).
16. Kolber allows that those who view punishment solely as a tool for incapacitation may be
excused since they, at least, are not so distracted by suffering. See Kolber, supra note 1, at 218
("[Interests in incapacitating people are largely independent of the subjective experience of the
incapacitated.").
17. Kenneth W. Simons, Retributivists Need Not and Should Not Endorse the Subjectivist
Account of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 1 (2009), http://www.columbialawreview
.org/Sidebar/volume/109/1_Simons.pdf. This Article in no way denies the fact that suffering
matters. See infra Part VI.
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practical considerations relating to penal technology. However,
pursuit of these important issues does not require a fundamental
critique of objective theories of criminal punishment. Quite to the
contrary, those theories provide ample grounds for criticizing much of
what goes on in contemporary criminal punishment policy and
practice.18 Nevertheless, these scholars have made undermining
objective theories of punishment, including some of the most
persuasive and enduring threads of retributivism and classic
utilitarianism, a focus of their projects. Those efforts fail to persuade
because they rely on a view of "punishment" as suffering or as some
other form of "subjective disutility."19 Retributivists and utilitarians
need not endorse this subjectivist account of punishment. To the
contrary, they should, as many do, draw a clear distinction between
the normative concept "punishment" and its contingent effects,
including subjective experiences of disutility and suffering. 20 Also
problematic is that these scholars often treat all suffering as
fungible. 21 For example, Adam Kolber's critique of retributivism turns
on the proposition that suffering experienced by an offender as a
18. See Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 71 MD. L. REV. 87 (2011) (arguing that
retributivism does not defend contemporary conditions of excessive and harsh punishment);
David Gray & Jonathan Huber, Retributivism for Progressives, 71 MD. L. REV. 163 (2010)
(arguing that objective retributivism provides persuasive reason to reject much of our current
punishment practice and criminal law policy). But see Alice Ristroph, How (Not) to Think Like a
Punisher, 61 FLA. L. REV. 727, 743 (2009) (arguing that retributivism is complicit in
contemporary conditions of excessive and harsh punishment).
19. See, e.g., Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1037 ("When the state punishes a criminal, it
inflicts suffering."); Kolber, supra note 6, at 1595-97 (arguing that the negative experiences
associated with punishment are what really matters in assessing punishment severity); Kolber,
supra note 1, at 212 ("[Tlhe subjective disutility of punishment is not some mere aftereffect of
punishment. Rather, it is largely or entirely the punishment itself.").
20. See JOEL FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING 118 (1970) (arguing that punishment is a
symbolic medium for expressing moral condemnation and that "[gliven our conventions, of
course, condemnation is expressed by hard treatment" but that "[p]ain should match guilt only
insofar as its infliction is the symbolic vehicle of public condemnation"); Jean Hampton, The
Moral Education Theory of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS
READER 112, 128 (A. John Simmons et al. eds., 1995) (distinguishing "punishment," which is a
"disruption of the freedom to pursue the satisfaction of one's desires," from subjective experiences
of punishment, which are often, but not always, painful); Carlos Nino, A Consensual Theory of
Punishment, in PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS READER, supra, at 94, 102-05
(arguing that punishment is fundamentally a normative concept). I am in debt to Amanda
Pustilnik for her revelatory work on pain, in which she elaborates on the temptations of this
mistake in multiple fields of law. See, e.g., Amanda Pustilnik, Violence on the Brain: A Critique of
Neuroscience in Criminal Law, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183, 187 (2009) ("[O]verreaching claims
about the applicability of neuroscience may lead to misapplications similar to those of prior
episodes of the criminal law-neuroscience story.").
21. See, e.g., Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1071 (arguing that punishment theory must
take into account the entire array of subjective negative experiences a specific punishment will
have on an offender in order to increase the prospects for achieving proportional punishments).
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direct consequence of his punishment, suffering experienced by that
offender if he is kidnapped and tortured by private parties before
arrest, 2 2 and suffering caused by prisoner-on-prisoner violence count
equally in the subjective arithmetic of "punishment."23 Likewise, John
Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur contend that
wistful sadness during incarceration and suffering consequent of post-
sentence discrimination by private parties both constitute
"punishment."24
Retributivists need not accept these views. In fact, many of the
most influential contributors to the retributivist canon are
scrupulously objectivist and carefully avoid subjectivism. 25 For these
retributivists, a particular punishment is justified only if, and to the
extent, it is deserved. While these retributivists may recognize
suffering as an experiential window into punishment, they maintain
that subjective suffering is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition of punishment.26 The subjectivist critique of retributivism
denies this defining feature of objectivist retributivism and then
derives a set of counterintuitive outcomes, leading critics to conclude
that retributivism is unworthy of defense and perhaps is self-
contradictory. 2 7 For example, Kolber argues that, because different
offenders experience the same penal sanction differently,
retributivists must, out of faith to proportionality, impose objectively
22. Kolber, supra note 6, at 1587-88.
23. Kolber, supra note 1, at 188.
24. Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1050-55; Bronsteen et al., supra note 3, at 1496
(arguing that punishment severity is based on the negative experiences associated with the
punishment, which should include the typical effects that incarceration has on offenders' lives
after prison).
25. See infra Part W.A. There are, as Mitchell Berman points out in a recent book chapter,
some punishment theorists who identify themselves as "retributivists" who endorse suffering as
a goal of punishment. Mitchell Berman, Two Types of Retributivism, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAw (R.A. Duff & Stuart Green eds.) (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript
at 7), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1592546 (cited with permission of author). According
to Berman, these theorists hold that offenders deserve to suffer for their crimes. Id. Berman
carefully teases out the serious theoretical and practical challenges faced by these theorists, who
are committed to a version of instrumentalism. Id. (manuscript at 8-16). For many of those
reasons, and for reasons elaborated in Parts III and IV, infra, this Article uses "retributivist" to
refer to and to promote objectivist theories of retributivism.
26. See FEINBERG, supra note 20, at 116-18 (arguing that social disapproval and its
appropriate expression is what should fit the crime, and not the amount of subjective suffering
experienced by the offender).
27. See Kolber, supra note 6, at 1582-83, 1600-06 (arguing that retributivism fails to
adhere to one of its central features-prohibiting disproportional punishments-when it fails to
calibrate punishment based on an offender's baseline subjective state); Kolber, supra note 1, at
199-216 ("In order to meet the proportionality requirement, retributivists must measure
punishment severity in a manner that is sensitive to individuals' experiences of punishment or
else they are punishing people to an extent that exceeds justification.").
1624
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weak sentences on rich and sensitive offenders and objectively more
severe sentences on offenders toughened by poverty and privation,
even if they commit the same crime. 28 However, once two distinctions
are reconstituted, one between objective punishment and subjective
suffering, and the other between objective and comparative
proportionality, it is clear that Kolber's subjectivist critique has no
bite on objectivist retributivism. Quite to the contrary, untenable
results such as those discussed by Kolber serve as good reasons for
retributivists to reject outright any claim that punishment severity
must be determined by measuring the subjective suffering it inflicts
on individual offenders. These uncomfortable outcomes, which Kolber
deploys against retributivism as purported reductio ad absurdum, are
definitely absurd. However, they derive not from premises indigenous
to retributivism but from the claim that punishment is, in whole or in
part, suffering. His critique therefore does not provide reason to reject
retributivism, but, rather, argues strongly in favor of holding the line
for objectivism.
Subjectivist critiques are also hard to square with utilitarian
theories of punishment. Again, the culprit is the reduction of
punishment to subjective experiences of suffering. For those who
advocate rehabilitation or incapacitation, subjective suffering is purely
incidental and has no theoretical role to play except, perhaps, at the
far margins. As Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur recognize,
subjective accounts of punishment may appear at first glance to have
more appeal for deterrence theorists, for whom the prospect of
precisely calibrating suffering promises an elegant parsimony. 29
However, there is good reason to pause before indulging this intuition.
Utilitarians are not behaviorists. The most serious contributors to the
utilitarian tradition have much more sophisticated views of human
beings, their possibilities, and their standards of reward and loss,
happiness and despair.30 Even a thin understanding of the views of
human nature and possibility held by eudaemonists such as Aristotle,
Mill, and their contemporary heirs31 raises serious questions for
28. See Kolber, supra note 1, at 183 (arguing that many retributivists would sentence
different offenders to different punishments even if they commit the same crime because of the
differences in the offenders' subjective experiences of punishment).
29. Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1074-75.
30. See generally Martha Nussbaum, Who Is the Happy Warrior? Philosophy Poses
Questions to Psychology, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 81 (2008) (criticizing the thin account of human
agents endorsed by the psychology literature of hedonic flow).
31. Richard Kraut and Martha Nussbaum are two of the most compelling contemporary
voices of the ancients. See generally, e.g., RICHARD KRAUT, WHAT IS GOOD AND WHY: THE ETHICS
OF WELL-BEING (2007); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY,
SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS]; Martha Nussbaum,
2010] 1625
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subjectivists, and particularly for Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur,
who organize their critique around the literature on hedonic
adaptation. Setting aside these richer accounts of utilitarianism, there
is good reason to question the conclusions drawn by scholars based on
the distinctive claim that punishment is, in whole or in part, the
suffering inflicted upon offenders by penal methods.32 For example,
deterrence turns on potential offenders' anticipated suffering if
punished. For both general and specific deterrence theorists, it is hard
to see how post hoc accounts of actual suffering would add to the
calculus when ex ante perceptions of potential suffering are what
count.33
The foregoing suggests a far more ambitious agenda than could
possibly be accomplished here. In particular, a full account of the rich
traditions in retributive and utilitarian approaches to criminal law
and punishment is impossible in this Article. The more modest goal
here is to defend objective theories of punishment by providing
credible grounds for the conclusion that subjectivist critiques indulge
a key conceptual error that is not endorsed by objectivists or entailed
by the mainline theories of punishment represented in the objectivist
tradition. This is an agenda in equal parts rehabilitative, critical, and
constructive, and is pursued with the explicit purpose of setting the
stage for a more rigorous exchange going forward with contemporary
subjectivists such as Kolber and Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur.
Part II provides an exegesis of the major subjectivist critiques. Part III
engages the core claim upon which these critiques rely-that
punishment is, and should be measured by, the subjective experiences
of those punished. Part IV defends retributivism. Part V provides a
brief defense of utilitarianism.
Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements, 9 FEMINIST ECON. 33 (2003) [hereinafter Nussbaum,
Capabilities].
32. While perhaps not the most nuanced, Judge Richard Posner is one of the most
prominent of the contemporary technical utilitarians. Nevertheless, as Adam Kolber notes, even
Judge Posner resists the idea that punishment should be measured or calibrated by reference to
the subjective disutility inflicted upon individual offenders. See Kolber, supra note 1, at 194 n.36
(citing a specific example where Judge Richard Posner declined to adjust an offender's sentence
downwards despite the offender's "high sensitivity" argument).
33. Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur note this "asymmetry." See Bronsteen et al., supra
note 1, at 1060-61 ("Deterrence ... is an ex ante phenomenon: the important issue is what harm
the prospective criminal believes she will suffer if she is caught and punished, not the harm that
she eventually experiences."). Dan Markel and Chad Flanders discuss this asymmetry at length
in an exchange with Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur. Compare Markel & Flanders, supra note
1 (arguing that the variance in the experience of punishment is not critically relevant to the
shape and justification of punishments), with Bronsteen et al., supra note 3, at 1467-81 (arguing
that the law should account for the differences in punishment experience when deciding how,
and how much, to punish).
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Part VI concludes by highlighting the important contributions
subjectivist critiques can make in debates about penal practice and
the role of mercy in criminal law. There, I acknowledge that the fact
that some punitive technologies produce excessive incidental suffering
is not trivial. To the contrary, proper management of penal practices
ought to minimize incidental suffering because that suffering is not
"punishment." However, this is a challenge for penal practice, and
cannot be used as a lever to unseat objective theories of criminal
punishment. Rather, the valid conclusions will be of a different order.
For example, the empirical observations that drive subjectivist
critiques may require abandoning some penal practices because they
produce large and unavoidable amounts of incidental suffering. Those
observations may also argue for modifying the circumstances of some
incarcerated offenders who experience levels of incidental suffering
beyond those we are willing to accept. Finally, demonstrations of
excessive incidental suffering may provide good moral or policy
grounds for acts of mercy.
Were contemporary subjectivists to pursue a careful accounting
of all suffering incidental to punishment for any of these applications,
they would provide valuable contributions to moral, criminal, and
penal theory. However, as a logical matter, these insights do not
threaten the coherency or persuasiveness of those theories of
punishment which define punishment objectively. To the contrary,
objectivist theories put us in the best position to condemn and remedy
sadistic penal practices, prison sexual assault, and discrimination
against convicts post-release precisely because those theories clearly
identify these practices as not "punishment." By contrast, the
approach endorsed by subjectivists, which holds that the suffering
occasioned by sadistic penal practices, prison sexual assault, and
discrimination against convicts post-release is punishment, is
incoherent, unpersuasive, and leads to disturbing consequences.
As this Article suggests, Kolber, Bronsteen, Buccafusco, Masur,
and I probably share many of the same concerns about our modern
criminal punishment practices and policies. We probably also share
many of the same instincts about what should be changed and how.
We differ principally on how and why we reach those conclusions.
They believe that, for example, prison rape should be stopped because
the suffering caused by prison rape is punishment. As an objectivist, I
believe prison rape should be stopped because it is not punishment.
For the reasons described below, I believe that objectivists have the
better view.
2010] 1627
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II. THREE VERSIONS OF THE SUBJECTIVIST CRITIQUE
The subjectivist approaches to punishment theory evidenced in
the work of Kolber, Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur are inspired by
a faith in the natural and social sciences as sources for public norms.34
While this turn is not new to penology or the criminal law, 35 the
science of interest to contemporary subjectivists is of more recent
vintage than the psychology and sociology that inspired Bentham's
panopticon 36 and the Model Penal Code. 37 Much of Kolber's
scholarship draws its inspiration from present, promised, and possible
breakthroughs in neuroscience, and particularly brain imaging and
mapping capabilities, 38 which allow neurologists and psychologists to
assign correlations between subjective mental states and activity in
different brain centers by monitoring comparative oxygenation.
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur's work focuses on social and
behavioral psychology with a special interest in survey work
documenting subjects' self-reporting of happiness.39 While distinct in
many ways, the scientific literature in these areas shares an interest
in quantifying or describing subjective mental states in precise
physical or psycho-social terms. What drives the subjectivist critique
and linked subjectivist approaches to punishment is the intuition that
34. Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1037; Kolber, supra note 6, at 1599 n.89; Kolber, supra
note 1, at 222-23.
35. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans.,
Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1979) (discussing the historical impact of social normalization on
criminal law).
36. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS (Miran Bozovic ed., Verso 1995) (1787).
37. It is worth noting that the American Law Institute is poised to abandon the
commitment to utilitarian concerns as the sole justification of punishment in the Model Penal
Code. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
38. See Kolber, supra note 11 (arguing that the content of the law should change to pay
more direct attention to experiences because more reliable technologies to measure such
experiences are becoming available); Kolber, supra note 1, at 222-23 (noting that emerging
neuroscience technologies may allow more accurate assessments of individuals' subjective
experiences in response to the argument that a system of subjectively calibrated punishments
would be impossible or prohibitively expensive to fairly administer).
39. Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1039-40, 1048 n.67. The psychology literature on
happiness has been applied to other areas of law as well. See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Christopher
Buccafusco, & Jonathan Masur, Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1518, 1527-35 (2008) (reviewing recent research in hedonic psychology and
applying it to the settlement of personal injury claims, arguing that procedural delays have a
counterintuitive corrective function because injured parties' initial perceptions of harm suffered
actually have little overall effect on ultimate well-being); Peter Huang & Rick Swedloff,
Authentic Happiness and Meaning at Law Firms, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 335, 339-42, 345-50
(2008) (considering recent research applying behavioral economics and positive psychology to




this potential descriptive capacity has revolutionary normative
significance. 40
As Kolber and Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur rightly note,
much of this science is tentative, and there remain good scientific and
theoretical reasons to exercise caution.41 It is certainly beyond the
expertise of this author to take sides in debates on the science.
Fortunately, it is not necessary to do so. For present purposes, I join
Kolber and Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur in noting that much of
this contemporary neuroscience and behavioral psychology research is
intriguing. The concern here is to determine whether and to what
extent we should endorse their claims that these early scientific
results should make us question the coherency of objective theories of
criminal punishment. This Part sets the stage by providing a brief
exegesis of the core subjectivist critique and by examining the
potential scope of the central move in that critical argument, which
holds that punishment is, in whole or large part, the subjective
experiences of those punished. Absent that premise, the critical
project falls. Later on, this Article argues that, because maintaining
the subjectivists' premise is the source of so much confusion and
absurdity, we are left with no reason to endorse any positive theory of
punishment built on subjectivist foundations.
A. The Subjective Experience of Punishment
In his provocative essay The Subjective Experience of
Punishment, Adam Kolber argues that prevailing theories of criminal
law and punishment must take into account subjective experiences of
40. Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1055-81; Kolber, supra note 11 (manuscript at 3, 13-
47).
41. Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1041; Kolber, supra note 11 (manuscript at 3-4, 8, 48-
50); see, e.g., John Bickle, Pricis of Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account,
4 PHENOMENOLOGY & COGNITIVE SCI. 231, 232-37 (2005) (suggesting key neurobiological
research is overlooked in the psychological literature and arguing that psychological
explanations should be resigned to more heuristic roles exploring questions for which low-level
cellular and molecular mechanisms of inquiry do not yet exist); John Bickle, Psychoneural
Reduction of the Genuinely Cognitive: Some Accomplished Facts, 8 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 265, 275-77,
282 (1995) (looking at empirical developments in the brain and behavioral sciences and
suggesting cognitivist and psychological theories of behavior will be increasingly supplanted by
neurophysiological accounts); Huib de Jong & Maurice Schouten, Ruthless Reductionism, 18
PHIL. PSYCHOL. 473, 478-485 (2005) (responding to Bickle and arguing for a continuing
productive relationship between psychology and neuroscience); Nussbaum, supra note 30, at 86-
101 (arguing that psychological literature investigating subjective well-being is replete with




punishment.42 He further contends that doing so produces
counterintuitive results that should lead us to question, if not reject,
those objective theories. 43 His argument gets off the ground by noting
that people may experience different subjective mental states in
response to the same stimulus. 4 4 In particular, offenders sentenced to
the same punishment-ten days' imprisonment, say-may, and often
do, experience qualitatively and quantitatively different "disvaluable
mental states."45
The point is hard to contest and is not trivial. To borrow one of
Kolber's examples, a prisoner who has claustrophobia will suffer more
and differently in a six-by-eight foot cell than an inmate who does
not.46 Similarly, literature relied upon by Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and
Masur suggests that many prisoners adapt to incarceration fairly
quickly while others do not.4 7 Setting aside idiosyncratic factors
shaping subjective mental states, some prisoners just have a rougher
time of it. Some are wrongfully convicted; others not. Some are sent to
prison for the first time from relatively secure and staid lives; others
are repeat offenders from rough backgrounds who have extensive
experience with incarceration. Some inmates are beaten and raped;
others are not. These objective differences are bound to produce
different quantities and qualities of "disvalue"48 even among
individuals with similar neuropsychological makeup when subjected
to the same "punishment."
42. Kolber, supra note 1, at 182; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND OF LEGISLATION 51-73 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1807)
(noting the circumstances that influence sensibility); Nigel Walker, Legislating The
Transcendental: Von Hirsch's Proportionality, 51 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 530, 533-34 (1992) (suggesting
failure to account for subjective "sensibility" differences among those punished may undermine
utilitarian theories rooted in personal deterrence).
43. Kolber, supra note 1, 184, 231.
44. Id. at 189.
45. Id. at 187 & n.5.
46. Id. at 190-91. While not at all trivial for practical penology, as is argued below, the
example holds no sway in core theoretical debates. The suffering a claustrophobe feels in the
form of severe anxiety is incidental to incarceration as a punitive constraint on liberty. There is
no contest that incidental suffering secondary to objectively justified punishment may raise
independent moral, constitutional, legal, or institutional questions; incidental suffering may
even rise to the level that amelioration or adaptation of penal technology is required. However,
these practical issues need not and do not pose a challenge to traditional theories of punishment
because punishment is neither justified nor measured by its ability to cause suffering.
47. See Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1046-49 & nn.58-67 (citing research indicating
improved adaptation and a decrease of emotional trauma in many prisoners over the course of
their sentences).
48. See Kolber, supra note 1, at 187 n.5, 213 n.88, 215-16, 220. As is argued below, this
choice of words suggests that something has gone wrong in subjectivist attack on retributivism.
See infra Part IV.
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In Kolber's view, the fact that objectively identical
punishments cause different kinds and quantities of subjective
disvalue has obvious normative significance. 49 For example, he points
out quite rightly that retributivists believe that punishment ought to
be proportionate in both absolute and comparative terms.50 That is,
retributivists hold that punishment must be proportionate to the
crime for which it is inflicted and to the blameworthiness of the
offender. As a consequence, retributivists also defend proportionality
across cases in keeping with the familiar principle that like cases
should be treated alike.51
Kolber claims that the imperative of proportionality commits
retributivists to some uncomfortable conclusions. 52 In particular, he
argues that retributivists must either abandon their commitments to
proportionality or must adjust sentencing to accommodate differences
in the subjective experiences of those who are punished, no matter the
source and nature of their sensitivities.53 Retributivists who refuse to
adjust objective punishments to accommodate the individual
sensitivities and circumstances of offenders run afoul of absolute
proportionality according to Kolber because they risk producing more
suffering in individual cases than is proportionate to the crime.54
Failure to titer punishment according to subjective sensitivities also
compromises comparative proportionality because offenders whose
crimes are in all relevant respects identical and who receive the same
punishment may nevertheless experience different quanta of
suffering.55
Depending upon the future goal they hope to achieve,
utilitarians are similarly obliged to calibrate suffering on an
49. Kolber, supra note 1, at 184.
50. Id. at 199. As Kolber points out, his critical argument is agnostic as to whether
proportionality in either form must or ought to be a constraint on punishment practices. Rather,
his argument proceeds from the quite accurate claim that retributivists are committed to the
claim that proportionality must and ought to be a constraint on punishment practices. Kolber's
critical project is to leverage that commitment using the fulcrum of subjectivism. As is argued
here, retributivists need not be subjectivists and, at least in light of Kolber's arguments, ought
not be subjectivists.
51. See generally Talia Fisher, Comparative Sentencing 39-40 (Oct. 13, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1488345 (describing proportionality across cases as a "cardinal precept
in retributivist theory"). As is pointed out in Part IV, this commitment to comparative
proportionality is not independent. Rather, it is wholly a consequence of the commitment to
objective proportionality.
52. Kolber, supra note 1, at 186-87.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 187, 215-16. "Comparative proportionality" should not be confused with Kolber's
critique based on the comparative nature of punishment.
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individual basis when inflicting punishment on Kolber's view.
Utilitarian theories of criminal justice are heirs to a robust moral
theory56 captured by John Stuart Mill in the principle "that actions
are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as
they tend to produce the reverse of happiness."5 7 In terms comfortable
to Kolber and other subjectivists, Mill defines "happiness" as "pleasure
and the absence of pain" and "unhappiness" as "pain and the privation
of pleasure."58 As Kolber points out, this primary commitment to an
economy of pain and pleasure cashes out for most utilitarians as a
balancing of the pain imposed by punishment and the pain prevented
through specific deterrence, general deterrence, rehabilitation, and
incapacitation. 59 No matter which of these goals one sets, Kolber
contends that individual calibration of punishment based on
subjective experiences of disutility is called for on utilitarian grounds
lest punishment produce surplus suffering and therefore suboptimal
ratios of, to use Mill's vocabulary, happiness and pain.60
Kolber contends that fealty to deterrence justifications leads to
the same uncomfortable results confronted by retributivists, including
a commitment to subject sensitive offenders to objectively less severe
treatment than insensitive offenders lest individual punishments or
penal systems more broadly inflict more suffering than is necessary to
achieve specific or general deterrence goals. Nevertheless, Kolber
maintains that, unlike retributivists, utilitarians are not categorically
committed to proportionality and therefore may be able to defend a
policy of inflicting objectively equivalent punishments on objectively
similar offenders regardless of differences in subjective experiences of
disutility if doing so serves external goals. 61 However, Kolber
maintains that this does not excuse utilitarians from recognizing
potential disparities between actual subjective suffering and the
amount of suffering justified by deterrence or other utilitarian goals;
56. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 48 (George Sher ed., Hackett Publ'g 1979) (4th ed.
1871).
57. Id. at 7.
58. Id.
59. See Kolber, supra note 1, at 216-17 (discussing utilitarian theories of punishment as
deterrence and the goals of optimal punishment); see also Kolber, supra note 6, at 1583 (further
noting utilitarian balancing of pain and happiness).
60. Kolber, supra note 1, at 216-219; MIL, supra note 56, at 7. As in his critique of
retributivism, the critical guidance Kolber offers to utilitarians is drawn from their own
commitments. His critical agenda is carefully agnostic as to ultimately endorsing any positive
theory of punishment. Kolber, supra note 1, at 235-36; see also Kolber, supra note 6, at 1608
(critiquing proportional retributivism but acknowledging "there may be other reasons to prefer
retributivism to consequentialism").
61. Kolber, supra note 1, at 186, 216-220, 230-35.
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rather, it is a cost that must be justified on a systemic level, where
offenders are nothing more than means for the achievement of larger
ends.62
B. The Comparative Nature of Punishment
In another article, Kolber argues that "we must understand the
burdens of incarceration in comparative terms."6 3 By "comparative"
here, he does not mean to compare individuals. 64 Rather, he uses
"comparative" to elaborate on the subjectivism discussed in his earlier
article. 65
The central insight is that we each have different baseline
conditions.66 Kolber contends that when we punish, we intentionally
or knowingly inflict harm on offenders in order to produce a negative
effect on their subjective states as compared to their baselines. 67
Based on that claim, he argues that the relevant measure of severity
for any particular punishment is the degree and quality of difference it
is able to achieve between an offender's prepunishment baseline and
his condition during punishment.68 Consistent with his earlier work,
Kolber argues that baseline conditions, conditions during punishment,
and conditions after punishment must be measured subjectively. 69
Kolber contends that criminal law theorists implicitly endorse this
account of punishment.70 He then goes on to argue that once we accept
the realities of comparative assessments of punishment, we find that
there is good reason to doubt our common intuitions about
62. Id. at 186, 198, 216.
63. Kolber, supra note 6, at 1573.
64. See supra note 55.
65. Kolber, supra note 6, at 1568-69; Kolber, supra note 1, at 196-99.
66. Kolber, supra note 6, at 1571-73.
67. Id. at 1571-75.
68. Id. Kolber grounds this argument in Joel Feinberg's influential work on measures of
harm in the tort context. Id. at 1571-72 (citing JOEL FEINBERG, FREEDOM AND FULFILLMENT 3, 7
(1992) and JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 31-64 (1984)). In another important essay
Feinberg analyzes the differences between comparative and noncomparative conceptions of
justice and points out that noncomparative measures play a dominant role in the criminal field.
Joel Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, 83 PHIL. REV. 297, 300-01, 311-13 (1974) [hereinafter
Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice]. Elsewhere, Feinberg provides a muscular rejection of
subjective suffering as a goal, measure, or justification of punishment. FEINBERG, supra note 20,
at 116-118.
69. Kolber, supra note 6, at 1573-75. Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur's work on hedonic
adaptation may have some relevance to this account. See Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1041-
54. If the temporal arc of punishment finds the offender returning to his baseline in very short
order, then it may turn out that, measured comparatively,. many punishments we regard as quite
severe are not so severe at all. See infra Parts II.C and V.
70. Kolber, supra note 6, at 1571-75.
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punishment severity. The core moves in his discussion of comparative
punishment echo and reinforce his earlier work on subjective
experiences of punishment.71
As he does in The Subjective Experience of Punishment, Kolber
once again focuses on retributivist commitments to absolute and
comparative proportionality. 72 If the goal of punishment is to achieve a
particular subjective state, then proportionality on both these
dimensions is easy enough to achieve. However, once one realizes that
the true measure of severity in punishment is the difference in
subjective states that a punishment achieves, we are led to the
conclusion that "retributivists must calibrate the punishment of each
offender by examining his baseline condition and his punished
condition." 73 In particular, on pain of offending proportionality, Kolber
contends that retributivists are committed to the view that offenders
with high baselines ought to receive objectively lighter sentences as
compared to offenders with lower baselines. 74 The alternative-
imposing the same punishment without regard to their different
baselines-risks producing disproportionate degrees and qualities of
subjective suffering and therefore disproportionate punishments of
two offenders who commit the same crime.75
The tickle of absurdity suggested by this result becomes a
psoriatic itch when Kolber sketches-in some details. Take, for
example, the common assumption that rich and privileged individuals
generally have higher baselines and therefore may suffer a precipitous
drop if subjected to imprisonment.76 Take then the contrasting
assumption that poor and downtrodden people have lower baselines
and therefore will fall less far when imprisoned.77 If all this is true,
then it appears to follow that for two offenders who commit the same
offense, proportionality requires retributivists to inflict only light
71. See supra Part II.A.
72. Kolber, supra note 6, at 1582-83.
73. Id. at 1582; see also id. at 1582-83, 1600-07 (arguing that retributivists abandon




76. Id. at 1567-68, 1600. As Kolber recognizes, this generalization based on an assumption
should not be given too much empirical weight, but is offered as a thought experiment to make
his point. Work by Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur show the wisdom of Kolber's caution. See
infra Part II.C. The complicated role of money in generating and modifying subjective states is
also explored in a recent study where researchers found that, compared to a control group,
subjects who had just counted money reported less suffering in response to painful stimuli.
Xinyue Zhou, Kathleen D. Vohs & Roy F. Baumeister, The Symbolic Power of Money, 20
PSYCHOL. SCI. 700, 702-04 (2009).
77. Kolber, supra note 6, at 1567-68.
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punishment on the rich and sensitive offender and relatively heavier
punishment on the hard-luck single mother working several minimum
wage jobs.78 That result follows, according to Kolber, as a matter of
necessity from strong commitments to proportionality, a fact which, he
concludes, ought to count as good reason to reject retributivism.79
As with his earlier work, Kolber's account of comparative
punishment has critical, but not devastating, consequences for
utilitarianism.8 0 For example, on first look, it appears that deterrence
theorists may be obliged to impose objectively lighter sentences on
wealthy and soft offenders.8 1 However, Kolber suggests that
utilitarians may find good reasons to reject this result. 82 For example,
it may turn out that reaching the threshold of specific and general
deterrence for folks with high baselines may sometimes require more
severe punishments. 83 That may be true, particularly in the case of
fines, which wealthy offenders likely would be able to absorb with
little or no change in comparative subjective state. Alternatively, there
may be good policy grounds not to show objective favor to rich and
privileged offenders so as to preserve public faith in the overall justice
system and therefore to preserve the relative utility gain achieved by
an objectively consistent rule-based system of punishment.84
C. Happiness and Punishment
Citing Kolber with approval for the conclusion that "[a]ll
leading theories of criminal punishment must be concerned with the
way punishment is subjectively experienced by the offender,"85 John
Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur argue in
their recent article Happiness and Punishment that a critical factor in
measuring the subjective disutility experienced by offenders is their
capacity for "hedonic adaptation."86 They draw the term and concept
from behavioral and social psychological studies based on self-reports
of contentedness and well-being.87 Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur
78. Id. at 1582-83, 1600-07.
79. Id. at 1600-07.
80. Id. at 1583-84; Kolber, supra note 1, at 236.
81. Kolber, supra note 6, at 1583-85, 1594-1600.
82. Id. at 1583-84.
83. See id. at 1583-84, 1596; Kolber, supra note 1, at 216-19.
84. See Kolber, supra note 6, at 1583-84, 1596; Kolber, supra note 1, at 187, 216-19.
85. Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1039 (citing Kolber, supra note 6, at 1596).
86. Id. at 1039; see also Bronsteen et al., supra note 3, at 1478-81, 1482-95 (extending this
argument).
87. Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1039-41. Calling to mind Mark Twain's quip that
"reports of my death are greatly exaggerated," in 1939 J.D. Mabbott reported the common belief
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report that these studies reveal interesting and sometimes
counterintuitive facts about the subjective experiences of disutility
experienced by offenders. In particular, they cite evidence showing
that most of us tend to adapt relatively quickly to changes in our
circumstances."8 Lottery winners initially experience much higher
degrees of satisfaction, but soon enough report a return to their
prewinning baselines.89 After a surprisingly short interval, people who
suffer disabling injuries adapt to their new circumstances and report
levels of happiness within the proximate statistical range of those who
are injury free.90
The message Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur take from
these studies is simple: above a relatively low baseline, differences,
and even dramatic differences, in material conditions do not correlate
with greater happiness. Money can't buy happiness. In addition,
changes in material conditions do not correlate with greater or lesser
happiness after a surprisingly short period of adjustment. We are
seldom satisfied, get bored easily, and quickly tire of even the prettiest
of shiny things. Good lessons to be learned knee-side all; but things
get really interesting when these grandfatherly reflections are applied
to prisoners.
According to Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, like lottery
winners, those subjected to criminal punishment report relatively
rapid adaptation.9 1 In particular, prisoners and those forced to pay
fines turn out to be emotionally supple in the face of hardship. While
initially distressed, prisoners tend to adapt fairly quickly to their new
circumstances and report a significant rebound in their levels of
happiness within a matter of months. 92 Likewise, those made to pay
fines report a drop in their levels of satisfaction when the fine is levied
and paid, but soon adapt to changes in their economic circumstances
and recount corresponding returns to their base levels of self-reported
happiness.93
On Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur's account, these studies
of hedonic adaptation reveal that most of the suffering associated with
that "the retributive view is the only moral theory except perhaps psychological hedonism which
has been definitely destroyed by criticism . " J.D. Mabbott, Punishment, 48 MIND 152, 152
(1939).
88. Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1039-46.
89. Id. at 1041.
90. Id. at 1041-42.
91. Id. at 1045-49.
92. Id.




imprisonment and fines is heavily frontloaded. 94 They go on to argue
that these results reveal the folly underlying the common view that
longer prison sentences and larger fines inflict correspondingly more
suffering.95 In fact, the phenomenon of adaptation reveals that years-
or even decades-longer terms of imprisonment inflict only marginally
more suffering, and perhaps no more.96 Similarly, so long as fines
leave payers with a basic level of material security, adaptation means
that the net suffering inflicted does not change appreciably as fine
amounts go up.97
Adaptation has its limits, of course. Some degenerative and
cyclical diseases such as rheumatoid arthritis and chronic headache
defy adaptation,98 as do some changes in social circumstances
including divorce, death of a spouse, and continued unemployment. 99
Perhaps more surprising are results suggesting that, though offenders
adapt fairly quickly to prison, they do not adapt as well to post-prison
life.100 The authors recognize that prison provides a fairly stable and
predictable environment, but that the reentry world is populated with
contingencies such as social marking, exclusion from work and society,
loss of family and social support networks, and limited employment
prospects, all of which work along a number of dimensions to inflict
suffering on ex-convicts. These travails do not diminish appreciably
over time.101 As a consequence, ex-convicts often report lower
sustained levels of happiness and satisfaction post-release than they
experienced while in prison. 102 This is a phenomenon familiar to those
who dedicate their careers to reentry work1 03 and is a frequent topic
for documentary reporting. 104
94. Id. at 1053-55.
95. Id. at 1055-57, 1070.
96. Id. at 1053-55.
97. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. But see Zhou et al., supra note 76, at 704-05
(reporting data suggesting that threatened loss of money can enhance subjective experiences of
pain).
98. Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1043-44.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1049-55.
101. Id. at 1052-54; see also infra note 103.
102. The authors make the quite insightful point that dramatic and sustained reductions in
happiness postrelease may contribute to recidivism by reducing convicts' subjective assessments
of their prospective reductions in happiness if they reoffend, are caught, convicted, and
reincarcerated because, in a real sense, they have little left to lose. Bronsteen et al., supra note 1,
at 1066-67.
103. See, e.g., Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 623, 626-32 (2006) (explaining that reentry-related services are available while noting the
significant challenges formerly incarcerated individuals still face); Michael Pinard, A Reentry-
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There is another funny quirk of hedonic adaptation identified
by Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur: our remarkable inability to
predict future adaptation.105 We always think that more money will
make us happier, even though it does not-at least not for long.
Criminals live in absolute dread of prison, even though they will
probably end up getting along pretty well there. According to
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, this failure to anticipate
adaptation is also immune to directly relevant experience. "Thus, even
people with substantial previous experience with a stimulus are
unlikely to remember that its hedonic impact was both weaker and
shorter than predicted."106 Even ex-convicts, who ought to know from
past experience that prison is not so bad, still fear it just as much as
those who have never had the privilege.107 Even those freshly adapted
to new economic conditions after paying a fine shudder at the thought
of being hit with another one. 108
The impact on criminal law theory and practice inflicted by the
work on hedonic adaptation cited by Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and
Masur is not entirely clear, but in their view it is nonetheless
important to recognize and accommodate these studies. For example,
they contend that both deterrence theorists and retributivists
commonly regard longer prison sentences and larger fines as linearly
or perhaps even exponentially more severe than shorter sentences and
smaller fines. In their view, the adaptation literature challenges that
assumption by showing that most of the suffering caused by prison
and fines is frontloaded and therefore that the overall suffering
imposed by a sentence is less than intuition might lead us to expect. 109
Centered Vision of Criminal Justice, 20 FED. SENT'G REP. 103, 103 (2007) (arguing for a criminal
justice system more focused on reentry, to help the growing numbers of individuals with criminal
records face the challenges of reentry); Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 459-61 (2010)
(explaining that scholars, attorneys, and others who have considered reentry issues "generally
recognize that the problem of postconviction collateral consequences is rapidly becoming more
severe"); Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 585,
594 (2006) ("[T]he most pressing problems that the ex-offender encounters are the obstacles that
interfere with the ability to make a smooth transition to being a productive member of the
community.").
104. See, e.g., A HARD STRAIGHT (New Day Films 2004).
105. Bronsteen et at., supra note 1, at 1044-45, 1060-61.
106. Id. at 1045.
107. See id. at 1061 ("People, as a general rule, do not remember their adaptive responses to
negative stimuli.").
108. See id.
109. Id. at 1048-49.
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While this insight appears to be important both for deterrence
advocates and for retributivists, the ultimate consequences are, as
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur note, equivocal.110 For example, it
might lead us to be skeptical of "tough on crime" demands for longer
sentences because they do not actually result in more deterrence or
proportionally more suffering.111 Alternatively, adaptation might
require indulging "tough on crime" demands to the extreme in order to
correct for diminishing suffering returns over time. 112 For utilitarians,
that dramatic ratcheting up of punishments may be constrained by
the fact that imprisonment is quite expensive in its own right.113
Given this and other considerations, the authors suggest that the
proper balance probably lies away from longer sentences. 114
III. THE LOGICAL LACUNA IN THE SUBJECTIVIST CRITIQUE
The subjectivist critique of traditional theories of criminal law
and punishment rides on the claim that "suffering," defined broadly as
negative subjective experience, is, to use Kolber's words, "a necessary
and usually substantial component of retributive punishment."115 This
Article argues that retributivists and classic utilitarians need not and
ought not endorse this premise. Section A sets the stage with a brief
overview of objectivist retributivism. 116 Section B exposes the key role
played by the claim that punishment is suffering in the subjectivist
critique of retributivism. There, the simple point is that the conclusion
that "retributivists must measure punishment severity in a manner
110. Id. at 1071-74.
111. See infra Part V.B (explaining the argument of Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur that
the phenomena of adaptation and of the human inability to predict personal future adaptation
"are in tension with traditional theory and current practice because the deterrent 'bang' is all
frontloaded," and thus, "longer sentences ... serve no utilitarian purpose").
112. Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1071-74.
113. See id. at 1074-75 ("If less punishment can achieve the desired end, then society gains
monetarily by eschewing a more severe alternative (in particular, a longer prison sentence).").
114. See id. at 1061-62 (explaining that failing to take adaptation into account will result in
calculations of punishment that are higher than necessary, from consequentialist standpoint).
This author does not contest this conclusion, but would argue for it on retributive grounds. See
Gray & Huber, supra note 18.
115. Kolber, supra note 1, at 215-16; see also Kolber, supra note 6, at 1595 (summarizing the
argument in The Subjective Experience of Punishment that "even if the disvalue of punishment
consists of more than just negative subjective experiences, those experiences are at least part of
what makes punishment burdensome"). Kolber makes the same claim about consequentialist
theories of punishment. Kolber, supra note 1, at 216-17. Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur
explicitly endorse Kolber's views on these key points. Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1039 n.4,
1069.
116. As Mitch Berman has pointed out, not all theorists who identify themselves as
retributivists are objectivists. Berman, supra note 25, at 7.
2010]1 1639
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
that is sensitive to individuals' experiences of punishment"117 depends
on the claim that "[the subjective disutility of punishment] is largely
or entirely the punishment itself."18 Section C tries to make sense of
the contention that suffering is "largely or entirely the punishment
itself' and concludes that there is little promise in the effort because it
results in the collapsing of familiar and necessary distinctions, such as
that between crime and punishment. This suggests that the more
persuasive and coherent approach to punishment theory is to
maintain a firm line between "punishment," defined in objective
terms, and the contingent effects of punishment, including the
subjective experiences of offenders. Parts IV and V offer further
arguments for why punishment theorists need not, and ought not,
endorse subjectivism. Part VI amplifies the position by pointing out
how progressive agendas for reforming our punishment practices are
better served by an objectivist approach to punishment rather than
full or partial subjectivism.
A. A Quick Sketch of One Objective Theory of Punishment
The defining feature of the criminal law is its claimed title to
impose state punishment. 119 The core challenge to any theory of
criminal law is its capacity to justify punishment generally and to
rationalize the punishments inflicted in particular cases more
specifically. 1 20 Retributivism is one answer to the call. While there are
differences among the theories advocated by its many and various
proponents, 121 retributivism is defined by its core commitment to the
principle that punishment can only be justified if, and to the extent, it
is deserved. 122 That commitment is often held in contrast to utilitarian
117. Kolber, supra note 1, at 216.
118. Id. at 212; see also Kolber, supra note 6, at 1595 (summarizing the argument in The
Subjective Experience of Punishment that "even if the disvalue of punishment consists of more
than just negative subjective experiences, those experiences are at least part of what makes
punishment burdensome").
119. This is not to deny that other legal and non-legal institutions and persons impose
penalties. Consider punitive damages awards, which raise their own theoretical and practical
concerns, none of which need be addressed here. For a retributivist understanding and
reconfiguration of such awards, see Dan Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work? 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 1383 (2009); Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages As
Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2009).
120. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1, 4-9 (1968) (discussing
justifications for punishment as they relate to different theories of punishment).
121. See Berman, supra note 25, at 7.
122. See, e.g., KANT, supra note 14, at 105 ("Punishment by a court ... can never be inflicted
merely as a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society. It
must always be inflicted upon him only because he has committed a crime."); MICHAEL MOORE,
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theories,123 which generally hold that punishment is justified if, and
only to the extent, it can achieve more good than ill.124
Desert, in the sense of having committed an offense, is a
necessary condition for state punishment in the eyes of
retributivists. 125 That is, if punishment is not deserved, then it cannot
be imposed. Desert is important not only as a threshold requirement
for punishment; it also plays a determinate role in defining and
limiting punishment in particular cases. Again, proponents differ in
the details, but in the main they share a commitment to objective
proportionality: to be commensurate with desert, punishment must be
proportionate to the offense or, in more poetic terms, punishment
must "fit" the crime. 126
Retributivists are not blind to context or insensitive to texture.
Variations among criminals and their acts have a role to play in
evaluating desert. Retributivists are particularly sensitive to the
variety of mental connections criminals may have to their acts. 127 The
PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 83 (1997) (defining "retributivist" as "one who
believes that the justification for punishing a criminal is simply that the criminal deserves to be
punished").
123. See KANT, supra note 14, at 105 ("Punishment ... can never be inflicted merely as a
means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society. It must always be
inflicted upon him only because he has committed a crime.").
124. See BECCARIA, supra note 3, at 13-14 ("Punishments which go beyond the need of
preserving the common store or deposit of public safety are in their nature unjust.").
125. See Berman, supra note 25, at 19 ("Non-instrumentalist retributivism would bar
[punishment in the absence, or in excess, of an offender's desert]."). Some retributivists also
argue that desert is a sufficient condition for punishment. See, e.g., KANT, supra note 14, at 105
("The law of punishment is a categorical imperative . . . ."); MOORE, supra note 122, at 88-89,
153-54 ("The distinctive aspect of retributivism is that the moral desert of an offender is a
sufficient reason to punish him or her . . . ."); Thomas Hill, Kant on Wrongdoing, Desert, and
Punishment, 18 LAw & PHIL. 407, 411-12 (1999) ("[D]eep retributivists hold [that it is morally
necessary that wrongdoers be made to suffer] as a fundamental moral principle, which can serve
to justify retributive policies of punishment."); Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of
Retributivism, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 179, 181-182 (Ferdinand
Schoeman ed., 1987) (stating that, from a retributivist standpoint, desert is "both a sufficient as
well as a necessary condition of liability to punitive sanctions"). As Nigel Walker points out,
however, many "modern" retributivists have shied away from the view that there is "an
obligation to punish, and substituted a mere right to punish" if and only if that punishment is
deserved. Nigel Walker, Even More Varieties of Retribution, 74 PHIL. 595, 601 (1999). For present
purposes, this Article need not take sides in this "duty" vs. "right" debate. Id. at 604.
126. This objective constraint frequently is interpreted as suggesting a hierarchy of crime
and punishment such that more severe crimes lead to more severe punishments. As is elaborated
below, this idea of a hierarchy of severity is somewhat misleading to the extent it suggests the
existence of a fungible unit of seriousness in crime and a corresponding unit of severity in
punishment. See infra Part W.A.
127. See, e.g., KANT, supra note 14, at 106-07 (explaining how various acts and punishments
have different significances to different individuals, depending on the respective individuals'
sensibilities); see also infra note 229 (providing a portion of the text of Kant's argument
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
commitment to proportionality therefore has a case-specific
dimension, measuring punishment not only by reference to the crime
itself but also according to the connection each offender has to his
crime-what we often call "culpability."1 28 This conception of guilt as a
combination of bad act and culpability is familiar to all first-year law
students. Indeed, requirements for actus reus and mens rea reflect the
long-standing influence of retributivism in the common law. 129 In this
regard, almost everyone is a retributivist, at least insofar as they
indulge the deeply held intuition that guilt, as a combination of act
and culpability, is a threshold qualification for punishment. 130
So, retributivists impose punishment if and only if the offender
deserves it-that is, if he is culpable in a crime. Fidelity to this
principle is not satisfied by the imposition of any old punishment upon
a finding of guilt. Rather, retributivists maintain that the punishment
inflicted in any given case must be deserved in its form and
dimension-it must fit the crime and must reflect the offender's
culpability. 131 From these commitments to proportionality in
individual cases, it follows that retributivists are committed to
proportionality between cases. If desert is determined by objective
standards, then equally culpable offenders who commit the same
crime should receive the same punishment in the normal course. From
the retributive point of view, however, the demand for comparative
regarding the varying significances of acts and punishments to various criminals, and explaining
its significance).
128. See ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363-65 (1983) ("The punishment
deserved depends on the magnitude . . . of the wrongness of the act, and the person's degree of
responsibility . . . for the act . . . .").
129. See Manuel G. Velasquez, Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything
They Do, in COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 111, 113-14 (Larry May & Stacey Hoffman eds., 1991)
(stating that the nineteenth-century common law required both an "actus reus" and "mens rea"
for criminal responsibility). These same prerequisites are also important in some utilitarian
systems. Herbert Wechsler's Model Penal Code, for example, maintained in different language
the common law requirements for a legal prohibition sufficient to meet legality demands, a
voluntary act, and a mental connection to the crime as prerequisites for criminal punishment.
See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.01-02 (1962) (requiring for criminal liability "conduct that includes
a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which [one] is physically capable," and
purposeful, knowing, reckless, or negligent action). Inclusion of these requirements in a largely
utilitarian system bespeaks the persistent influence of retributivism.
130. Omissions and strict liability crimes may seem to constitute exceptions. For reasons
outside the scope of this Article, I do not think they are. See David Gray, You Know You Gotta
Help Me Out (Oct. 28, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
131. See, e.g., Taylor v. Superior Court, 477 P.2d 131, 141 (Cal. 1970) (Mosk, J., dissenting)
("Fundamental principles of criminal responsibility dictate that the defendant be subject to a
greater penalty only when he has demonstrated a greater degree of culpability.").
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proportionality is derivative of the demand for noncomparative
proportionality.132
B. Punishment as Suffering
The subjectivist critique of retributivist approaches to criminal
law relies on a premise that retributivists need not and ought not
endorse: that suffering, or some other form of subjective disutility, "is
largely or entirely the punishment itself," the imposition of which "is a
necessary component of retributive punishment and constitutes, if not
the sole reason for retributive punishment, certainly a major part of
it."133 The centrality of this premise to the subjectivist critique of
retributivism is evident if we consider in quasi-symbolic form Kolber's
argument based on comparative proportionality-like cases ought to
be treated alike-from The Subjective Experience of Punishment 34:
1. If an offender commits crime C, then the offender receives punishment D.
2. A commits crime C.
3. B commits crime C.
4. Therefore A receives punishment D.
5. Therefore B receives punishment D.
6. D equals D.
7. Therefore, A and B receive equal punishment.
8. If A receives punishment D, then A experiences quantum of suffering X.
9. If B receives punishment D, then B experiences quantum of suffering Y.
10. Therefore, A experiences quantum of suffering X.
132. Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, supra note 68, at 300-01, 311-13, 318-19; see also
MOORE, supra note 122, at 90-91 (arguing that the noncomparative proportionality principle of
retributivism allows for a determination of "which cases care truly alike," and thus, allows like
cases to be treated alike). As Feinberg points out, comparative disparities may reveal
noncomparative injustice, and comparative disparities may underwrite moral sentiments of
injustice-particularly immature moral sentiments-but where disparities do not reveal
noncomparative injustice, claims that a wrong has been committed do not carry much weight.
133. Kolber, supra note 1, at 212-13. Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur are fairly
straightforward in their endorsement of the proposition that punishment is suffering, stating
that, "When the state punishes a criminal, it inflicts suffering," where "suffering" is a self-
reported state of "unhappiness." Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1037-38. Kolber's critique of
retributivism is also committed to the view that retributivists must define punishment as
suffering, though he is less definitive on what constitutes "suffering," which is evidenced by his
preference for the phrase "subjective disutility." Kolber, supra note 1, at 212-213; see also id. at
197-198 (explaining the relevance of prisoners' subjective experiences).
134. Kolber, supra note 1, at 215-16; see also Kolber, supra note 6, at 1600-01 ("[Tlhe
comparative nature of punishment makes a purely objective notion of proportionality
untenable.").
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11. Therefore, B experiences quantum of suffering Y.
12. Xis not equal to Y.
13. Therefore, A and B do not receive equal punishment.
This argument purports to be a form of reductio ad absurdum.
Here, the alleged contradiction is between the conclusions reached on
lines 7 and 13, which hold both that A and B receive equal
punishment and that they do not. The problem is that these
conclusions follow from incommensurable premises. The conclusion on
line 7 follows from the familiar principle that like cases ought to be
treated alike. However, the conclusion reached at line 13 follows only
after introducing assessments of our offenders' subjective experiences
of punishment, set forth on lines 8, 9, and 12. The introduction of
these subjectivist premises is not itself an argumentative foul so long
as they can be independently proved. Kolber's and Bronsteen,
Buccafusco, and Masur's arguments in favor of subjectivism are
addressed below, but for now they shall be assumed arguendo. The
real difficulty comes in the move made in line 13. Line 13 only follows
from earlier premises and interim conclusions if we add and accept the
premise that "punishment" and "quantum of suffering" are in some
material way equivalent and therefore interchangeable without
semantic loss. 135 If they are not, then the argument is invalid by virtue
of a fallacy of equivocation and ought to be rejected. 136 Kolber and
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur do not specify the extent or
dimension of the logical or semantic equivalence between
"punishment" and "suffering" upon which their critiques rely. The
next Section therefore takes some time to explore the possibilities and
the argumentative consequences.
135. Kolber makes a similar argument based on the retributivist commitment that
punishment ought to be proportionate to the crime for which it is imposed. Kolber contends that
an offender may experience a quantum of suffering disproportionate to his crime, a prospect that
presents retributivists with a potential contradiction. Kolber, supra note 1, at 199-216; see also
Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1068-69 (crediting Kolber's argument that "different
individuals' experiences of punishment must be taken into account"). Again, however, the
claimed tension is between two claims-1) that an offender has received a punishment
proportionate to his crime; and 2) that the same offender has received a quantum of suffering
disproportionate to his crime-which are not in contradiction absent the added premise that
punishment is suffering.
136. "Equivocation" is used here for its technical meaning, denoting a semantic shift within
an argument that allows the proponent to draw an unwarranted conclusion. BLACKWELL
DICTIONARY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 249 (Nicholas Bunnin & Jiyuan Yu eds., 2004).
PUNISHMENTAS SUFFERING
C. What It Might Mean to View Punishment as Suffering
In their work on punishment, Kolber and Bronsteen,
Buccafusco, and Masur advance two agendas:137
The first is largely critical. Relying on examples, thought
experiments, hypotheticals, and the results of self-reported studies of
happiness, they expose endemic disparities in the suffering accounts
tallied by various punitive practices. Based on these disparities, they
argue that long-standing theories of criminal punishment do not or
cannot justify these deficits or surpluses, and therefore must modify
their sentencing recommendations on pain of contradiction. 13 8 Where
the modifications required to preserve a theory of punishment are
sufficiently distasteful, they contend that the theory itself ought to be
abandoned.
The second, and as yet less well-developed, goal appears to be
describing a role for new observational technologies and techniques in
designing and assessing punishment practices. 139 This Section targets
the first of these agendas.
The subjectivist critique purports to upend traditional theories
of punishment by arguing that these theories cannot bear the burden
of justifying heretofore underappreciated kinds, measures, disparities,
and surpluses of suffering. This leaves open the question of what
suffering counts as "punishment" and what suffering does not. Closer
examination of that question reveals that much of the suffering upon
which the subjectivist critique relies cannot fairly be characterized as
punishment and that doing so leads to absurd or incoherent results.
1. All punishment is suffering, and all suffering is punishment.
The subjectivist critique turns on the claim that negative
experiences of offenders-suffering-must count when defining what
punishment is and when assessing the severity of particular
punishments. This leaves open the question of what suffering counts
and what does not.140 One possibility would be to claim that
137. Kolber, supra note 1, at 184-85.
138. Id. at 235-36.
139. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, & Jonathan Masur, Welfare as Happiness,
98 GEO. L.J. 1583, 1596 (2010) (explaining the availability of measures for gauging "the well-
being that people actually feel"); Kolber, supra note 11, at 3-4 (explaining that "new technologies
have already shifted the way we measure experiences and will continue to do so more
dramatically over the next thirty years," and arguing that these technologies "should ... change
the way we assess criminal blameworthiness and punishment severity").
140. Kolber recognizes the centrality of this claim to his enterprise. See Kolber, supra note 1,
at 214 (noting that "[o]nly if one believes that experiential suffering should not count at all are
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punishment and suffering are perfectly coextensive. There is no
ground for such a claim. Familiar counterexamples make the point.
Those struck down by flu, cancer, lightening, or a bus most definitely
suffer. However, none of these afflictions can fairly be categorized as
"punishment."141 The category of "suffering" is therefore larger than
"punishment." It follows that subjectivists cannot justify the premise
they need by claiming that punishment and suffering are perfectly
coextensive. The addition of "state-imposed" as a qualifier for
"suffering" does not advance the cause. States impose a host of
"disvaluable" 142 conditions on individuals within their thrall ranging
from taxes to mandatory military service to quarantines, none of
which are "punishment" by any familiar use of the term. 143
we relieved entirely of the obligation to calibrate subjective experience," which is the logical
equivalent of saying that "if one believes that experiential suffering should not count at all then
we are relieved entirely of the obligation to calibrate subjective experience").
141. See Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 344 (1983) ("God
and humans can punish; hurricanes cannot."). Some readers may cavil, suggesting that
background facts will demonstrate that these unfortunate souls "deserve" disease or physical
harm because they contributed to the constellation of risks that eventually led to their suffering.
See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 38-39 (Terence Irwin trans., 2d ed. 1999) ("[W]e
never censure someone if nature causes his ugliness; but if his lack of training or attention
causes it, we do censure him."). While perhaps true in some cases, it is not true in all cases. Id.
Regardless, the claim turns on another equivocation, neatly captured by Kant's distinction
between "poena forensis" ("[p]unishment by a court') and "poena naturalis" ("in which vice
punishes itself and which the legislator does not take into account"). KANT, supra note 1414, at
105; see also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW 231 (2007) (discussing
Hart's fourth and fifth requirements for punishment, which "address the qualities required of the
punishing authority"); HART, supra note 120, at 4-5 (defining punishment to include the
following characteristics: "[i]t must be for an offence against legal rules . . . of an actual or
supposed offender for his offence . . . intentionally administered by human beings other than the
offender . . . imposed and administered by a legal system against which the offence is
committed").
142. "Disvaluable" states might be defined objectively, without regard to whether a
particular person experiencing that state finds it pleasant or unpleasant. That is the approach to
punishment advanced in a recent article by Dan Markel and Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts:
The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010)
(manuscript at 142), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1587886 ("[W]hat retributivists ought
to care about foremost is the imposition of the punishment as a communication directed at the
offender, not the offender's idiosyncratic and variable reaction to the coercive condemnatory
deprivation."). However, Kolber clearly means "disvaluable" states to refer to those states which
actually cause a particular offender to experience some degree of subjective experience that is
subjectively experienced as negative. Kolber, supra note 1, at 187 n.5.
143. FEINBERG, supra note 20, at 106. The range of such state impositions provides ready
counterexamples for other attempts to refine further the claim that punishment is suffering
along this general line. For example, were subjectivists to define punishment as state-imposed
suffering in response to a voluntary act, they would have to distinguish income taxes, which are
imposed in response to earnings, sales taxes, which are imposed in response to purchases, and
registration requirements, which are imposed upon those who, for example, decide to own and
drive a car. For an engaging analysis of taxes as non-punitive measures, see LIAM MURPHY &
THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE (2002). As is argued here, the
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2. All punishment is suffering, but only some suffering is
punishment.
Another candidate for the missing premise is that punishment
defines a wholly contained subset of suffering such that all
punishment is suffering, but not all suffering is punishment. At some
points, Kolber appears to hold a version of this view, suggesting that
"the subjective disutility of punishment . . . is largely or entirely the
punishment itself."144 Likewise, Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur
appear to hold that the purpose of punishment is to inflict suffering. 145
While certainly more conservative, this view already represents a
significant concession. Specifically, it acknowledges that offenders
subjected to punishment may experience not only suffering that falls
within the scope of their punishment but additional, incidental,
suffering as well.146 Therefore, while this claim-that suffering
occupies the entire field of punishment, but punishment occupies only
a corner of suffering-may provide some solace for subjectivists on the
level of hard logic, it highlights the fact that extraordinary care is
necessary in analyzing the claim so as not to indulge in an
equivocation between suffering properly within the scope of
punishment and incidental suffering.'47
This is a rather fine but crucial point, and therefore deserves a
bit more attention. The conclusion reached by subjectivist critics is
that our current theories of criminal punishment do not keep an
accurate tally of offenders' suffering; and, furthermore, once a proper
tally is done, at least some of the theories deployed to justify
punishment are so upside-down that they are impossible to
stomach.148 That argument only goes through if critics such as Kolber
and Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur can make a conclusive
argument for including in the tally the categories and cases of
suffering they believe are ignored by the objectivist theories they
flow of counterexamples only abates when one recognizes desert as a necessary and defining
feature of punishment; and, further, taking this constraint on punishment seriously requires
measuring punishment objectively, without regard to the idiosyncratic experiences of offenders.
144. Kolber, supra note 1, at 212.
145. See Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1037 ("When the state punishes a criminal, it
inflicts suffering. There are limits on the amount and type of suffering that may legitimately be
imposed. . . .").
146. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 616 (1960) (asserting that administrative
consequences, such as "bar[ring] from practice [of medicine] persons who commit or have
committed a felony," are an exercise of "regulatory power," and do not "add to the punishment").
147. As is argued below, the examples, hypotheticals, and thought experiments offered by
Kolber as reductio ad absurdum against traditional theories of criminal punishment are guilty of
precisely this equivocation. See infra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
148. Kolber, supra note 1, at 184-85.
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attack. If it turns out that much or all of the suffering these scholars
focus on falls outside the extension of "punishment" properly defined,
then the entire enterprise is constructed upon an equivocation
between punishment and suffering and must be abandoned in favor of
more conservative, but nevertheless important, pursuits. 149
Kolber concedes the distinction, noting that "not all
experiential suffering in prison is imposed in a knowing or intentional
way."150 However, he goes on to maintain that "even if some
experiential suffering should not count, we must still consider the
suffering that does." 15 ' This immediately presents the question of
what suffering counts and what does not, as it does important
normative questions such as why the suffering that counts does and
why the suffering that does not count does not. -
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur must confront the same
issue. Reducing "punishment," as they do, to self-reporting of
happiness and suffering fails to distinguish among sources and causes.
For example, an imprisoned offender who happens to be a life-long
devotee of The Guiding Light may have descended into abject despair
upon cancellation of the show in 2009, but the "suffering" occasioned
by that loss would be incidental to his punishment. Bronsteen,
Buccafusco, and Masur and others who rely on self-reported happiness
to advance subjectivist accounts of punishment might argue that these
incidental sources of suffering can be regressed out of the statistical
results. However, they have so far not indicated an awareness of the
need. 52 Furthermore, acknowledging the need for regressions from
the raw data of self-reported happiness still leaves unanswered the
questions of what suffering counts, what does not, and why.
If it is true that some suffering is incidental and some not, then
it may simply be the case that all the subjective inequalities Kolber
and Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur are concerned with, whether
measured subjectively, comparatively, or diachronically, are incidental
to punishment and therefore impose no duties of accommodation or
accounting on theories of punishment. To avoid that result, these
critics are on the hook for clear, plausible, and defended criteria that
can distinguish between suffering that is "punishment" and suffering
that is not. The criteria upon which Kolber and Bronsteen,
Buccafusco, and Masur appear to rely to fulfill this burden is a
149. See infra Part VI.
150. Kolber, supra note 1, at 213.
151. Id. at 213-14.
152. See Nussbaum, supra note 30, at 86-88, 96-97 (noting that those who rely on self-
reported happiness do not account for the ambiguity of incidental suffering).
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modified version of proximate cause, either in the form of suffering
inflicted purposely or suffering inflicted knowingly. 153 Neither is
sufficient to fulfill the argumentative and theoretical burdens of the
subjectivist critique.
3. Suffering is only punishment if it is purposely inflicted.
While not explicitly endorsed by Kolber or Bronsteen,
Buccafusco, and Masur, "purpose" as a criterion for distinguishing
suffering that is punishment from suffering that is incidental is a
familiar refrain in their writing.154 "Purpose" certainly appears to
mark a sharp distinction between suffering that is punishment and
suffering that is incidental to punishment. Unfortunately, it fails to
answer three crucial questions: (1) what suffering is intended; (2) by
whom; and (3) why.155 Consider, for example, prisoner-on-prisoner
violence. If an offender sentenced to a term of imprisonment is the
target of violent assaults by other prisoners solely to fulfill the sadistic
impulses of his attackers, then is the suffering caused by those
assaults "punishment"? It is certainly a consequence of the offender's
imprisonment, but it is hard to imagine how it could be characterized
as "punishment." Quite to the contrary, these kinds of attacks are
crimes.
Critics of retributivism and utilitarianism who base their
arguments on the proposition that the severity of a punishment, and
therefore punishment itself, is in whole or large part a function of the
subjective experiences of offenders, must distinguish between
punishment and unjust treatment, including criminal acts, as the
causes of disvaluable experiences. Otherwise, they risk including in
their severity tallies causes and therefore mental states that no theory
of punishment needs to or should aspire to justify.
Neither Kolber nor Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur carefully
respect this important distinction. For example, Kolber regards
prisoner-on-prisoner violence as "punishment" rather than crime,
contending that "variations in [prison] conditions," including "physical
and sexual violence," "reflect objectively observable features of
153. See Kolber, supra note 1, at 196-98; Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1069.
154. See, e.g., Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1037; Bronsteen et al., supra note 3, at 1487
n.99 (defending purpose as an element of proximate cause as a criterion for determining whether
suffering is punishment); Kolber, supra note 1, at 196-98 (arguing that the primary burden of
criminal theory is to justify "purposefully or knowingly inflict[ing] substantial pain or distress");
id. at 212-13 ("Subjective disutility is a necessary component of retributive punishment and
constitutes, if not the sole reason for retributive punishment, certainly a major part of it.").
155. See Kolber, supra note 1, at 195-96. This is a significant omission. See FLETCHER, supra
note 141, at 228 (interpreting Hart); HART, supra note 120, at 4-5.
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punishment."15 6 Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur at least implicitly
endorse the same claim, including in their tally of unaccounted
suffering "prison sexual violence" and its consequences. 15 7 However,
these authors offer no argument for the quite counterintuitive
proposition that prison rape is "punishment." The error is in the
collapsing of two distinct moral concepts-"crime" and "punishment"-
into an undifferentiated category of contingent effects-"suffering."
The consequences are far from trivial.
For Kolber, "subjective disutility" constitutes the "sole" or
"major" reason for punishment,15 8 and the suffering caused by sexual
assault constitutes "punishment."15 9 Presumably, he does not believe
that sexual assault committed outside of prison is "punishment,"
which means that location is a necessary criterion such that prison
sexual assault is "punishment" principally because it happens in
prison.160 The consequence of this account is that the "subjective
disutility" inflicted by sexual assault is rendered entirely fungible
with the suffering inflicted by restraints on liberty characteristic of
imprisonment generally. That is, when tallying up the "punishment"
that has been imposed on an offender, we are obliged on Kolber's view
to count on equal footing the subjective disutility caused by prison
rape and the subjective disutility caused by loss of the opportunity to
travel to Belize.
If this argument is accepted, then those who suffer at the
hands of other prisoners seem to have no right to object, no claim for
protection, and no right to demand the prosecution and punishment of
their abusers. Quite to the contrary, if the suffering occasioned by
prisoner-on-prisoner violence is "punishment," and "punishment" is
the suffering which offenders deserve as a consequence of their crimes,
then the perpetrators of sexual assault in prison are by definition
immune from prosecution because the suffering they inflict is
"punishment." Further, because suffering appears to be fungible for
156. Kolber, supra note 1, at 188.
157. Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1050; Bronsteen et al., supra note 3, at 1489.
158. Kolber, supra note 1, at 212-13.
159. Id. at 188.
160. "Knowledge" or "purpose" on the part of someone may also be necessary in Kolber's
view. However, neither is sufficient. As is discussed below, agents who act knowingly or
purposefully to put another person at certain risk of harm may be criminally or tortiously liable
for their conduct, but that knowledge or purpose does not convert the harm into "punishment."
See infra note 161 and accompanying text. The story in no way changes if the person who
knowingly or purposely puts his victim in harm's way is a state official. Therefore, to maintain
his claim that prison sexual assault is a component of "punishment" when it occurs, Kolber
appears to be committed to the view that location is an essential criterion when distinguishing
between sexual assault that is punishment and sexual assault that is not punishment.
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subjectivists, victims of prison violence can be made whole by early
release when the total quantum of suffering they deserve is reached
and therefore would have no personal claim that abuse at the hands of
other prisoners should be stopped, much less prosecuted.
This is clearly specious, and it is impossible to believe that
Kolber or Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur would endorse these
results. Retributivists and most utilitarians certainly would not.
However, Kolber and Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur cannot avoid
these consequences unless they take seriously the proposition that
"crime" and "punishment" are fundamentally moral rather than
forensic concepts that are equally comprehensible through the
heuristic of suffering or other forms of subjective disvalue. The more
persuasive view is that prisoner-on-prisoner violence is unlawful, is
perpetrated by the wrong people (prisoners rather than agents of the
criminal justice system), is inflicted for the wrong reasons, and
therefore is crime, not punishment.161 If that is right, then any
suffering occasioned by prison crime need not, and in fact cannot and
ought not, be justified by any credible theory of punishment because it
is not "punishment."162 Further, critiques that purport to find a flaw in
traditional theories of criminal punishment because those theories do
not justify differences in suffering occasioned by prison crime proceed
on an unjustified equivocation.16 3
Another of Kolber's thought experiments suggests an
alternative to "punishment" as all suffering purposely inflicted:
"punishment" as suffering purposely inflicted by prison authorities.164
Unfortunately, this does not turn the trick. Kolber asks us to imagine
161. See FLETCHER, supra note 141, at 227-33. In recognition of this fact, some courts have
held that where a prisoner escapes from custody out of fear of prisoner-on-prisoner violence he
may claim a defense based on necessity. See, e.g., People v. Unger, 362 N.E.2d 319, 322-23 (Ill.
1977).
162. Respecting Hart's prohibition, I do not mean to argue by definition. See HART, supra
note 120, at 6 (cautioning against definitional arguments). Rather, the point is that if
subjectivists want to jettison three of the five commonly identified characteristics of punishment
Hart cites, its advocates must provide a robust normative argument for their departure.
163. See Kolber, supra note 1, at 186-88 (making just this critique). This is not to say that
prisoner-on-prisoner violence is of no moral or legal significance. Prison officials are charged with
protecting those under their care from unlawful assault. Failures by prison officials to provide
sufficient protections from prison violence may be tortious or criminal. Mercy may also
recommend early release for offenders subject to criminal violence in part as a reflection of
institutional failures to provide adequate security and protection. However, none of this makes
prisoner-on-prisoner violence "punishment" such that failures by retributivists or utilitarians to
account for it and justify it would provide reasons to abandon their theories of punishment. To
the contrary, prisoner-on-prisoner violence is a crime, and suffering occasioned by crimes
committed in prison is, strictly speaking, incidental to punishment. Kolber's contrary claim-
that prison rape is an element of punishment-is troubling to say the least.
164. Id. at 197.
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a sadistic warden who abuses his position to inflict unjustified
additional suffering on his charges purposely by affirmative
conduct. 165 Kolber argues that a theory of punishment that fails to
account for differences in suffering between prisoners treated with
respect and care by a virtuous warden and those abused at the hands
of a sadistic warden cannot on pain of contradiction be sustained. This
just repeats the core conceptual mistake. Just because a criminal
wears a badge does not make him any less a criminal; neither does a
position of authority end the conversation about justice in action. Out
of respect for that distinction, traditional theories of punishment,
including retributivism, do not endorse abuse at the hands of prison
officials as "punishment." Kolber regards this as a fatal flaw in those
theories. 166 That perspective is unsympathetic at best. To endorse
Kolber on this point would be to dissolve the distinction between crime
and punishment, would promote even the worst abuses perpetrated by
prison officials to the status of "punishment," and would deny claims
for protection from those who suffer at the hands of sadistic officials as
long as they are released when their suffering thresholds are reached.
Kolber might respond by claiming that "punishment" is the
suffering that authorities acting within the proper bounds of their
official roles purposely inflict for the right reasons. While plausible,
that claim needs elaboration because it raises important normative
questions. Parts IV and V survey some of the possible grounds.
Remaining for now inside Kolber's critique, the impact of such a
concession is simply devastating. First, it recognizes the fact that
punishment is fundamentally a normative concept not, as his
subjectivist critique would have it, an undifferentiated forensic
phenomenon. Second, it upends his attack on retributivist and
utilitarian theories that hew closely to objective rather than subjective
accounts of punishment.
Kolber and Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur use examples,
thought experiments, and self-reporting studies of prisoner happiness
to argue that there is quite a lot of unaccounted for and unjustified
suffering in the criminal justice system. To use that surplus as a
wedge to split objectivist versions of retributivism and utilitarianism
from within, Kolber and Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur must
argue that those theories of punishment have the burden of justifying
the constituents of the surplus. However, if "punishment" is suffering
165. Kolber, supra note 1, at 197; see also Kolber, supra note 11. Kolber extends his thought
experiment to include omissions as well. That extension is addressed below.
166. Id. at 197-98.
1652 [Vol. 63:6:1619
PUNISHMENTAS SUFFERING
purposely inflicted by the proper person for the proper reasons, 167 then
no theory of criminal punishment is obliged to justify suffering
purposely inflicted by the wrong people for the wrong reasons or the
unintended suffering that may incidentally result from punishment.168
Kolber and Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur fail to respect this
crucial distinction.
The point is not that severe idiosyncratic anxiety and prisoner-
on-prisoner violence do not matter; they surely do.169 The question is
"why?" In the subjectivists' view, these things matter because they are
punishment. Objectivists think that these things matter precisely
because they are not punishment. If what Kolber and Bronsteen,
Buccafusco, and Masur mean when they conflate "punishment" and
"suffering" is the suffering purposely inflicted by the right person for
the right reasons, then any suffering that falls outside that range is by
definition incidental, probably unjustified, likely subject to protest,
perhaps grounds for a tort claim or criminal action against the
inflictor of that suffering, and, where widespread, would require
systemic reform of punishment practices. However, precisely because
it is incidental, objectivist forms of retributivism and utilitarianism
bear no burden to justify this additional or surplus suffering because
it is not "punishment," and therefore is not justified. This may seem
like a bit of semantic sophistry. However, maintaining the distinction
between "punishment" and "suffering" is critical, as is evidenced by
the subjectivist critique itself.170
167. HART, supra note 120, at 4-5.
168. As is suggested in Part I and elaborated further in Part VI, objectivist theories provide
powerful tools for recognizing and condemning abuse in prison and create obligations on the part
of prison officials to minimize incidental suffering. To the extent Kolber and Bronsteen,
Buccafusco, and Masur want to press a progressive agenda against prison sexual assault,
improvements in prison conditions, vigorous reentry programs, or other efforts designed to curb
abuse and limit incidental suffering, this author has no objections. To the contrary, the point
here is that objective theories of criminal punishment provide more powerful tools for advancing
those agendas than the subjectivist critiques pressed by Kolber and Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and
Masur. For that reason, and because their critiques do not offer any reason to reject objectivist
accounts of punishment, Kolber and Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur should embrace objective
over subjective accounts of punishment.
169. See infra Part IV.
170. Consider as an example the following passage: "While some theorists purport to hold
objective accounts of punishment that ignore offenders' subjective experiences, such theories are
doomed to fail. By ignoring subjective experience, they cannot justify the amount of distress that
punishment inflicts on offenders, and so they cannot justify punishment more generally." Kolber,
supra note 1, at 184; see also Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1068, 1072 n.166. The fallacy in
this argument is now evident in light of subjectivism's failure to justify the equivocation from
"punishment" to suffering. If, as it now seems, the suffering these theories ignore is incidental,
then punishment theory carries no obligation to justify that suffering because to do so would
conflate criminal abuse with just punishment. Far from constituting a failure of theory, then,
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4. Suffering is only punishment if it is knowingly inflicted.
What remains to subjectivist critics is the claim that suffering
is "punishment" if it is "knowingly" inflicted.17 1 This approach also
raises crucial questions. For example, is actual knowledge required, or
would something akin to the Model Penal Code's "aware[ness] of a
high probability" do?172 Who must possess the knowledge? When? How
can they get it? Do officials carry epistemic duties? If so, what are the
outlines of those duties? These are not trivial issues. We can set them
aside for now, however, because simply adverting to "knowledge"
rather than "purpose" does not solve the conceptual problems
elaborated in the previous subsection.
The fact that a sentencing judge is aware of a high probability
that the offender before him will be the victim of violent crime while
incarcerated does not convert that crime or the suffering it causes into
"punishment" by some miracle of epistemic prestidigitation. Further,
because prisoner-on-prisoner violence is not punishment, authorities
who know it is likely to occur have a duty to stop it. They may even be
liable for their failures. The consequences of holding otherwise are the
same as those elaborated above in the discussion of "purpose" as the
marker between crime and punishment.
The failure of the subjectivist critique to respect key normative
lines is also evident in arguments that punishment is "comparative" in
nature.17 3 Take for example Adam Kolber's "abducted drug dealer."174
Kolber asks us to imagine a drug dealer who, on the day he is to begin
his prison sentence, is kidnapped by a rival gang and held in prison-
like conditions.'75 If he is later found by law enforcement officials and
immediately transferred to official custody where his subjective
experiences of disutility are identical to those suffered while in the
unlawful custody of the rival gang, Kolber concludes that the drug
dealer is not being punished, and that he therefore "must be placed in
an even smaller cell (or otherwise have a more liberty-constrained
sentence) in order to exact the same deprivation of liberty relative to
his baseline that we exact from others who commit the same crime." 76
retributivists' and utilitarians' refusals to justify incidental suffering is a necessary, not a
condemnatory, feature of their efforts to justify punishment more generally.
171. See, e.g., Kolber, supra note 1, at 196-98 (arguing that the primary burden of criminal
theory is to justify "purposefully or knowingly inflict[ing] substantial pain or distress");
Bronsteen et al., supra note 3, at 1479.
172. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1962).
173. See generally Kolber, supra note 6.





Kolber admits that "[this] result seems very
counterintuitive,"177 and so it does. Unfortunately, he does not plumb
the source of those intuitions, which are grounded in the normative
distinction between crime and punishment. That Kolber's argument
does not distinguish between an unlawful kidnap, which is neither
justified nor deserved, and lawful incarceration, which is both justified
and deserved, raises serious questions about his description of
punishment in comparative terms and his attached critique of those
theories of punishment that define punishment in objective rather
than subjective terms.
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur's argument, which draws on
the social science and psychology literature on hedonic adaptation, is
equally problematic insofar as it defines "punishment" as suffering
that a judge knows will result from conviction and imposition of
sentence. As Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur point out, among the
more pernicious sources of suffering for felons are a variety of
constraints on liberty that are consequent of conviction, including
denial of the franchise, difficulty finding work, and the loss of
professional licenses.178 Of course, the Supreme Court routinely has
held that these kinds of administrative consequences, even if inflicted
by state agents, are not "punishment," and therefore need not meet
constitutional standards of criminal process. 179 That does not mean
that government agents are liberated from any duty to justify these
practices or the suffering they cause. Rather, the point is that, because
they are incidental to punishment, they must be independently
justified and must pass muster under the Fourth, Fifth, or Fourteenth
Amendments, rather than the Eighth.
To sum up a bit, the subjectivist critique of objective theories of
punishment proceeds from the premise that punishment is in whole or
in large part the subjective experience of those who are being
punished. That claim credits as "punishment" whole categories of
suffering that cannot plausibly be counted on the tally card of
"punishment," including subjective disutility caused by criminal
conduct. Rather than reflecting a mistake, the failure of criminal
177. Id. at 1588. Equally counterintuitive is the implied suggestion that the best way for an
offender to reduce the objective severity of his punishment would be to go on a wildly pleasurable
vacation right before submitting to custody.
178. Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1049-53.
179. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003) (sex offender registration
requirements are not "punishment"); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997)
(administrative incarceration of convicted sex offenders is not punishment); Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603, 616 (1960) (administrative consequences, such as "bar[ring] from practice [of
medicine] persons who commit or have committed a felony," are exercises of "regulatory power,"
and do not "add to the punishment").
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theory to justify incidental suffering of this sort now appears to be
both intentional and reasonable. To the extent theories of punishment
are obliged to justify any suffering at all, that obligation runs only to
suffering linked to and justified by the theory of punishment that is
deployed. To paraphrase a great American intellectual, "punishment
is as punishment does."1 so
This may seem circular, but it is not. Objective theories of
punishment are grounded in normative principles external to
punishment practices and the experiences of individual offenders.
That normative dimension is what is lost in the whole or partial
reduction of "punishment" to subjective experience, revealing the
subjectivist critique to be what H.L.A. Hart in a similar context called
"a spectacular non sequitur."181 The next two Parts offer brief exegeses
of some of the major objective theories of punishment and further
expose the dangers of linking "punishment" to subjective experiences
of punishment. What this discussion reveals is that a forensic account
of suffering is at best a heuristic device for understanding a
fundamentally normative concept.182
IV. OBJECTIVISM PART 1: RETRIBUTIVISM
The subjectivist critique of retributivism turns on the
proposition that a defining feature, core purpose, and primary
justification of retributive punishment is the infliction of suffering.183
For example, Kolber asserts that "retributivists hold that offenders
deserve to suffer for their crimes."184 In somewhat stronger terms,
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur claim that "[w]hen a retributive
180. See MOORE, supra note 122, at 25 (arguing that to explain "punishment" one must
explain a sanction's punitive purpose). I refer to Tom Hanks's eponymous character in Forrest
Gump (Paramount Pictures 1994), but the adage traces to a proverb of much longer history: "He
is handsome that handsome doth." WILLIAM G. BENTHAM, BOOK OF QUOTATIONS PROVERBS AND
HOUSEHOLD WORDS 788 (1907).
181. HART, supra note 120, at 19.
182. FEINBERG, supra note 20, at 111-18. This conceptual mistake has a long history tracing
back at least to Plato. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, 227-31 (Francis MacDonald Cornford trans.,
1945). More recently, it is a mistake common in efforts by lawyers to make sense of new
knowledge and technology at the cutting edge of medicine, neuroscience, and the social sciences.
See generally Pustilnik, supra note 20.
183. See, e.g., Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1068-70; Kolber, supra note 1, at 197, 199,
212-13, 215-16.
184. Kolber, supra note 1, at 199 (emphasis omitted). Kolber does credit some retributivists
for being objectivists. However, for reasons addressed below, he concludes that these theories
either devolve into subjectivist theories or are otherwise obliged to recognize and justify
differences in the subjective experiences of offenders. Id. at 212-13, 215-16; Kolber, supra note
6, at 1585-86.
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theory addresses the severity of punishment, that severity is
necessarily measured in terms of the harm or negative experience
imposed on the offender."185 Retributivists need not and ought not
endorse this view.186
Retributivists use "punishment" in a precise way, referring to
background theories of crime, criminal agency, and justice. Pain and
suffering under these theories may be an incidental effect of
punishment, but punishment is neither justified nor measured by its
capacity to produce pain and suffering.187 This may strike subjectivist
critics and some readers as odd. That confusion is no doubt due in part
to the fact that retributivism often is confused with baser sentiments
of vengeance, 88 what Susan Jacoby has called "Wild Justice."189 While
there certainly are some blustery law-and-order types who share this
view-and angry calls for revenge frequently do dominate public
conversations about punishment in the face of horrific crimes-the
explicit task of retributivism as a theory of justice is to resist slavery
to emotions like anger and bloodlust in favor of cool reason.190
Retributivism is defined by the proposition that punishment
can be imposed only if, and only to the extent, it is deserved.191 From
the retributivist point of view, the failure of the subjectivist critique to
distinguish between crime and punishment reveals the project's core
pathology: its failure to recognize that just punishment for
185. Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1073 n.166.
186. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 20, at 116-18 (rejecting this view); FLETCHER, supra
note 141, at 228 (same); Hampton, supra note 20, at 128-29 (same); Herbert Morris, A
Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, 18 AM. PHIL. Q. 263, 270 (1981) (same). As Mitchell Berman
has pointed out, there are some contemporary retributivist theorists committed to a version of
instrumentalism because they endorse a version of the subjectivist claim that the goal of
punishment is to inflict suffering. See Berman, supra note 25. For these scholars, this Article
should provide substantial motivation to prefer objective approaches.
187. See FEINBERG, supra note 20, at 116.
188. See MICHAEL E. MCCULLOUGH, BEYOND REVENGE: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
FORGIVENESS INSTINCT 41-87 (2008) (arguing that the revenge instinct has an almost universal
appeal, from an evolutionary point of view, for creatures such as human beings, who live in
cooperative communities); MILL, supra note 56, at 50-51 (noting roles of moral outrage and
instincts of self-defense in punitive impulses).
189. See generally SUSAN JACOBY, WILD JUSTICE: THE EVOLUTION OF REVENGE (1983). One
also cannot help but recall Foucault's vivid account of the elaborate execution of Damien.
FOUCAULT, supra note 35, at 3-6.
190. NOZICK, supra note 128, at 366-70; see also GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL
LAW 417 (2000) ("[Retributivism] is obviously not to be identified with vengeance or revenge, any
more than love is to be identified with lust."); J.F. STEPHENS, GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF ENGLAND 99 (1863) ("The criminal law stands to the passion of revenge in much the
same relation as marriage to the sexual appetite.").
191. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 141, at 228; HART, supra note 120, at 4-5; MOORE,
supra note 122, at 153; Hampton, supra note 20, at 128-29.
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retributivists is essentially a deontological, moral concept, 192 and that
suffering describes normatively neutral experiential phenomena. 193
This semantic slippage between normative and descriptive terms is
not uncommon, 194 but is nonetheless without foundation and the
source of much confusion in the subjectivist literature and elsewhere.
Subjectivist critics' claims to the contrary notwithstanding,
retributivism defines punishment as a restraint on liberty or other
consequence that is determined and justified objectively by reference
to a culpable offense. 195 Section A explains this approach to
punishment, paying particular attention to Immanuel Kant's work. 196
Section B responds to several criticisms of objective accounts of
punishment advanced by subjectivist critics. Section C returns to the
subjectivist critique of retributivism to reveal that the absurd results
credited to retributivism, including the apparent obligation to impose
lesser sentences on wealthy, sensitive offenders than on their poor and
hardened peers, are a consequence not of retributivism but of the
distinctly subjectivist claim that "punishment" is "suffering."
Therefore, those unpalatable results serve as reasons to reject, not
objective retributive theories, but the subjectivist critique and the
192. Nino, supra note 20, at 102.
193. This is in contrast to most utilitarians-with the notable exception of Bentham-who
maintain that suffering and happiness by their nature have a normative valence. See Nussbaum,
supra note 30, at 92-95.
194. FLETCHER, supra note 190, at 396-401.
195. See, e.g., id. at 415-18, 461-62, 505-14; FLETCHER, supra note 141, at 228; KANT, supra
note 14, at 104-09; Hampton, supra note 20, at 128-29. Kolber acknowledges that some
retributivists are objectivists rather than subjectivists, yet argues those theorists must account
for subjective experiences of punishment in their theories. Kolber, supra note 6, at 1585-86;
Kolber, supra note 1, at 215-16.
196. The discussion of Kant's theory of punishment presented here is necessarily brief and as
a consequence blurs over substantial debates among Kant scholars. See, e.g., Sharon Byrd,
Kant's Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in its Threat, Retribution in its Execution, 8 LAW &
PHIL. 151, 153 (1989) (arguing that Kant envisioned threat of punishment as a deterrent and
execution of punishment as objective retribution); Samuel Fleischacker, Kant's Theory of
Punishment, in ESSAYS ON KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 191 (1992) (bringing an interpretation
of Kant's theory of punishment more in line with wider moral thought); Thomas Hill, Kant on
Punishment: A Coherent Mix of Deterrence and Retribution?, 1997 ANN. REV. L. & ETHICS 291,
293 (1997) (arguing that the deterrence elements in Kant's view of punishment serve an
important but restricted role); Jeffrie Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 509, 532 (1987) [hereinafter Murphy, Does Kant] (arguing, in disagreement with
his past self, that Kant did not create an internally consistent theory of punishment over the
course of his career); Jeffrie Murphy, Kant's Theory of Criminal Punishment, in RETRIBUTION,
JUSTICE AND THERAPY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 82, 84-90 (1979) [hereinafter
Murphy, Kant's Theory] (defending Kant's retributivist theory of criminal punishment from
utilitarian objections); Don Scheid, Kant's Retributivism, 93 ETHICS 262, 265 (1983) (arguing that
Kant is not a thoroughgoing retributivist but a partial retributivist).
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subjective approach to punishment that some of these critics
endorse. 197
A. The Retributive Account of Punishment
While utilitarian approaches to punishment dominated the
conversation amongst theorists and practitioners for years
surrounding and following Herbert Wechsler's work on the Model
Penal Code, retributivism has since enjoyed a revival. 198 In fact, the
current draft of the Model Penal Code, which is in the last stages of
adoption by the American Law Institute, abandons its exclusive
endorsement of utilitarian justifications of punishment in favor of an
approach bounded by retributivist principles.199 The federal approach
to punishment also cites retributivist commitments as its first
principle. 200 Retributivism therefore plays an important role not just
in the history of the common law, but in contemporary punishment
policy and practice as well.
"Retribution," according to George Fletcher, "simply means
that punishment is justified by virtue of its relationship to the
offense." 201 While retributivists vary in the details of what this
relationship is, 2 0 2 the core of the theory was described by Immanuel
197. Kolber has not offered a positive theory of punishment and therefore has not endorsed
subjectivism. Part of the purpose of this Article and the exchanges in which it participates is to
persuade Kolber and others that his critique actually ought to lead him to endorse an objective
theory of punishment. Cf. Markel & Flanders, supra note 142, at 111 (explaining that because
they enjoyed equal freedom in making their decisions to commit crimes, criminals should get
substantially, i.e. objectively, equal punishments). Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur have gone
further. See Bronsteen et al., supra note 3, at 104 (endorsing subjective approaches to
punishment).
198. FLETCHER, supra note 190, at 416; WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAw 30 (2003).
199. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) (tentative draft Apr. 9, 2007) ("Purposes; Principles of
Construction. (2) The general purposes of the provisions on sentencing, applicable to all official
actors in the sentencing system, are: (a) in decisions affecting the sentencing of individual
offenders: (i) to render sentences in all cases within a range of severity proportionate to the
gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders; (ii)
when reasonably feasible, to achieve offender rehabilitation, general deterrence, incapacitation of
dangerous offenders, restoration of crime victims and communities, and reintegration of
offenders into the law-abiding community, provided these goals are pursued within the
boundaries of proportionality in subsection (a)(i); and (iii) to render sentences no more severe
than necessary to achieve the applicable purposes in subsections (a)(i) and (a)(ii)."). At least one
prominent author has criticized this revision. See Ristroph, supra note 18, at 729-745 (attacking
the revision's reliance on desert in sentencing guidelines).
200. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006) (stating that the law must provide just punishment for
the offense).
201. FLETCHER, supra note 190, at 416-17; see also MOORE, supra note 122, at 83.
202. See generally John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238, 238 (1979)
(distinguishing nine such relationships).
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Kant in The Metaphysics of Morals.203 The central feature of Kant's
moral theory is the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative
is expressed in several ways, but for present purposes the Universal
Law formulation will do with its command that "I should never act
except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should
become a universal law."2 04 To understand what Kant means by this it
is necessary to understand what he means by "will" and "maxim."
Laying the foundation for the German Enlightenment and its
heirs, including John RawlS205 and Jurgen Habermas, 206 Kant draws a
broad distinction between faculties of will set to a specific purpose-
what one might call instrumental reason 207-and faculties of will that
operate in a reflective capacity to measure and determine the desires
that lie at the heart of action-what Kant calls "practical reason" or
"Wille." 2 08 The line drawn is roughly between those rational processes
by which we choose among means to our ends and the rational
processes by which we choose our ends. Reason plays a crucial role in
both fields of cogitation, but the nature of the reasons and the
structures and rules of rationality in these two fields are distinct. For
example, expediency, efficiency, and a balancing of costs and benefits
dominate instrumental rationality generating hypothetical
imperatives of a familiar "if . .. then. . ." form. However, those
hypothetical considerations have no first-order role when deciding
among competing goals or principles of action, where the nature of the
questions is categorical, thus requiring complementary categorical
answers. Similarly, contingencies of circumstance take center stage in
generating hypothetical imperatives, which by definition are attached
to particular problems in the phenomenal world. By contrast,
categorical imperatives, while necessarily influenced by inescapable
existential realities, eschew the vagaries and vicissitudes of the world
203. See John Bronsteen, Retribution's Role, 84 IND. L.J. 1129, 1131 (2009) (noting centrality
of Kant in the punishment canon). Kant's theory of punishment is a subject of hot debate among
Kant scholars. See supra note 196.
204. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 14 (James Ellington
trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1983).
205. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 251-57 (Harvard Univ. Press 2005) (1971).
206. 1 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 8-42 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984) (1981).
207. Kant uses "willkur." See KANT, supra note 14, at 13 (distinguishing will or choice
[willkiir] from a mere wish).
208. Id. at 12-14.
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in favor of regulative ideals drawn from noumenal structures of reason
itself.209
In Kant's system, hypothetical imperatives and categorical
imperatives line up with distinctions between prudential
considerations of what is possible or advisable and more purely
normative considerations of what is right, just, or good.210 So, for good
instrumental reasons, one might determine that pursuit of a
particular goal or desire is unwise-because doing so would impose too
many limitations on the pursuit of other goals and desires, say-but
that determination would go to whether it is possible to pursue a
particular end rather than whether that end is in fact good. While it is
not always possible to perform our duties to the good in the messy real
world, duty still serves a crucial function as a regulative ideal.21'
By invoking "will" in his formulation of the categorical
imperative, Kant refers to categorical rather than hypothetical reason.
The workings of categorical reason entail the identification and
evaluation of maxims. A maxim is "[a] rule that the agent himself
makes his principle [of action] on subjective grounds."212 It is the
postulate that describes the action without reference to either the
goals that action might serve or instrumental considerations of effect
and efficiency. 213 Kant allows that different agents may have different
maxims for actions which appear identical when observed from the
outside.214 However, for normative purposes, the question is always
whether the maxim of an agent's act may be made universal law. The
resolution is found in a simple thought experiment. Agents
considering a particular action must ask themselves whether the
209. This account of freewill is not without its critics. See, e.g., Murphy, Does Kant, supra
note 196, at 523-24 (arguing that Kant did not want to remove all considerations of the
criminal's mental state from analysis of their desert of punishment).
210. KANT, supra note 14, at 13.
211. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 312-13 (Norman Smith trans., St.
Martin's Press 1965) [hereinafter KANT, CRITIQUE]. Kant's conception of a Kingdom of Ends
serves a similar role in his historical philosophy. While outwardly naive in his hope for a society
where everyone acts in a purely moral fashion, Kant is well aware that we are a "race of devils,"
and therefore need the external constraint of a state writing law in the shadow of the bloodbath
of history to compel us to an approximation of the ideal. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A
Philosophical Sketch, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 93, 105, 112-13 (Hans Reiss ed., Cambridge
University Press 1991) [hereinafter Kant, Perpetual Peace]; see also RAWLS, supra note 205, at
246.
212. KANT, supra note 14, at 17. An agent's maxim of action is by definition available only to
him, but it can be imputed to him based on his actions. Id. at 19.
213. Thomas Hill has a slightly different reading, concluding that maxims incorporate
"rationales" in keeping with "general principles of rational choice." As Hill admits, however, that
reading sets aside "Kant's troublesome references to 'noumenal' causation." Hill, supra note 125,
at 415-16.
214. KANT, supra note 14, at 17.
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maxim of their action can be universalized without contradiction.
Therefore, the categorical imperative is a crucible, testing the logical
purity of a maxim in the fires of generality where internal
contradictions are revealed. If a maxim fails the test, it is the moral
duty of the agent to refrain from acting upon it.
Examples are always helpful in understanding what Kant is on
about here. Let us consider theft. An agent considering whether or not
to take the property of another must first consider the maxim of his
action. Recall that maxims are abstracted from instrumental goals
and rationalizations. So, where the question is one of moral duty, the
use to which an agent proposes to put the property is irrelevant, as are
other reasons he might have for stealing. The essence of theft, and
therefore its maxim, is taking the property of another. To determine
whether that maxim is consistent with the moral law, the agent must
ask whether the maxim "I take that which is not mine" may be
generalized and made a universal rule of action without contradiction.
Quite obviously, the answer is "no." Were all agents to act upon the
maxim "I take that which is not mine," then the concept of mine and
thine upon which the maxim of theft is predicated would disappear.
Theft is therefore wrong because it contradicts the principal of
ownership internal to and presupposed by the very concept of theft
itself.215 Because the maxim of theft cannot be made universal law
without contradiction, agents have a duty not to steal.
Ideally, agents will respect their duties as determined by the
categorical imperative and embrace right action as an ethical
matter.216 Kant is no Pollyanna, however. He recognizes that humans
are a "race of devils," and therefore require as a condition of justice an
external authority that can propagate and enforce the commands of
moral duty in the form of law. 217 States, like agents, are subject to the
commands of the categorical imperative. 218 Consequently, states may
215. In a purely communist society the maxim of theft, "I take that which is not mine," would
be nonsensical because there is no conception of mine and thine. This reveals that, in all but a
few cases, moral duty is derivative of background social practice. Two notable exceptions are
murder and suicide, which, taken to their logical ends, would entail the destruction of humanity
and the exercise of reason in general. It is therefore impossible as a moral matter for a society to
condone or allow murder or suicide.
216. KANT, CRITIQUE, supra note 211, at 312-13.
217. IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE 87-91 (Thomas M.
Greene & Hoyt H. Hudson trans., Harper & Row 1960) [hereinafter KANT, RELIGION]; Kant,
Perpetual Peace, supra note 211, at 93, 105, 112-13; see also RAWLS, supra note 205, at 315;
Murphy, Kant's Theory, supra note 196, at 87-90 (anticipating HART, supra note 120, at 4-9,
who distinguished among three questions: (1) Why have a system of punishments? (2) Who
should be punished?; and (3) What form should punishment take?).
218. KANT, CRITIQUE, supra note 211, at 312; Murphy, Does Kant, supra note 196, at 521-28.
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enact and enforce only those laws that are consistent with the freedom
of all and which respect the autonomy of subjects as citizens. 219 That
constraint forbids the use of punishment to effect or "promote some
other good for the criminal himself or for civil society" 2 2 0 because to do
so would contradict the concept of autonomy upon which society as a
collection of free agents is constructed. 221 Rather, punishment can only
be imposed "because [the agent] has committed a crime," that is,
because it is deserved.222
That punishment qua punishment can only be imposed because
it is deserved by an agent who has committed a crime does not answer
the question of what punishment is deserved.223 Kant's reply is "the
principle of equality (in the position of the needle on the scale of
justice), to incline no more to one side than to the other."2 2 4 That is far
from illuminating until considered in light of Kant's account of crime.
By definition, a crime poses a contradiction to state-defined justice,
inclining the needle. To right the needle, the contradiction must be
resolved. The terms of that resolution are contained within the maxim
of the crime upon which the offender himself acts. Just punishment
demands no more and no less than expiation of the contradiction
posed by the criminal and his crime. "Accordingly, whatever
undeserved evil you inflict upon another within the people, that you
inflict upon yourself. If you insult him, you insult yourself; if you steal
from him, you steal from yourself; if you strike him, you strike
yourself; if you kill him, you kill yourself."225 This has the veneer of
simple revenge as "an eye-for-an-eye," but Kant provides additional,
crucial, clarification, writing "But what does it mean to say, 'If you
steal from someone, you steal from yourself?' Whoever steals makes
the property of everyone else insecure and therefore deprives himself
(by the principle of retribution) of security in any possible property." 226
This is the standard of justice for Kantian retributivists: the
logical contradiction posed by an offense under law must be carried to
its natural end and resolved for society by imposing the consequences
of that contradiction on the offender. Punishment that provides this
resolution is just because the offender is made to bear the logical
consequences of his offense. Punishment other than what is necessary
219. KANT, CRITIQUE supra note 211, at 312.
220. KANT, supra note 14, at 105.
221. RAWLS, supra note 205, at 241.
222. KANT, supra note 14, at 105.
223. HART, supra note 120, at 24.
224. KANT, supra note 14, at 105.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 106.
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in light of the crime is unjust, either because it fails to right the needle
or because it goes too far. It is critical, however, that punishment is
measured and determined by objective standards. The goal of
punishment is most definitely not to cause some quantum of
subjective suffering. 227 Neither is the amount or degree of suffering
experienced subjectively by an offender the measure of punishment. 228
Rather, punishment is the objectively determined, logical consequence
of a crime imposed upon an offender by the state. The maxim of theft
poses a contradiction to the concept of ownership upon which the laws
of property are predicated; therefore the proper legal punishment for
227. As Thomas Hill has pointed out, moral agents may well feel "discomfort" when they
realize their wrongdoing and may even accept as appropriate the condemnation of others.
However, those self-directed reactive attitudes are an "inherent liability in being one moral
agent among others," and "[t]here is no ground here for supposing that this suffering, or even
more, should be deliberately imposed," or that "wrongdoers deserve to suffer in any practical
sense that entitles others to contribute to their suffering." Hill, supra note 125, at 421-22, 424.
228. See Kolber, supra note 1, at 184 n.1 (citing Kant in a "cf." footnote for the proposition
that punishment must be proportional to the subjective experiences of offenders). The passage he
cites reads in full:
But only the law of retribution (ius talionis)-it being understood, of course, that this
is applied by a court (not by your private judgment)-can specify definitely the quality
and the quantity of punishment; all other principles are fluctuating and unsuited for a
sentence of pure and strict justice because extraneous considerations are mixed into
them. -- Now it would indeed seem that differences in social rank would not allow the
principle of retribution, of like for like; but even when this is not possible in terms of
the letter, the principle can always remain valid in terms of its effect if account is
taken of the sensibilities of the upper classes. -- A fine, for example, imposed for a
verbal injury has no relation to the offense, for someone wealthy might indeed allow
himself to indulge in a verbal insult on some occasion; yet the outrage he has done to
someone's love or honor can still be quite similar to the hurt done to his pride if he is
constrained by judgment and right not only to apologize publicly to the one he has
insulted but also to kiss his hand, for instance, even though he is of a lower class.
Similarly, someone of high standing given to violence could be condemned not only to
apologize for striking an innocent citizen socially inferior to himself but also to
undergo a solitary confinement involving hardship; in addition to the discomfort he
undergoes, the offender's vanity would be painfully affected, so that through his
shame like would fittingly be repaid with like.
KANT, supra note 14, at 106. Read incautiously, this passage may appear to endorse a
subjectivist account of punishment. It mentions "pain" and "shame" after all. To rest on this
surface would be to ignore the crucial reference to retribution and its role in determining the
objective necessity for shaming in certain circumstances. Here, Kant recognizes that some crimes
express a maxim of status entitlement. Proper punishment in these circumstances requires
bringing low the prideful. Kant is democratic in this respect. He refuses to endorse class as a
claim of right to do wrong. The contemporary criminalization of hate crimes reflects a similar
disposition. Jean Hampton's approach to retributivism also focuses on negating unfounded
claims of entitlement. See infra notes 255-59 and accompanying text. Thomas Hill reads this
passage slightly differently, but ultimately also reaches the conclusion that it does not
provide grounds for thinking that Kant is giving leave for judges to vary punishments
according to subjective factors. Hill, supra note 125, at 434-37. For a more expansive account
of status inequality in crime and potential responses, see David Gray, A No-Excuse Approach to
Transitional Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1043 (2010) [hereinafter Gray, No Excuse]; and David
Gray, Extraordinary Justice, 62 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
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an act of theft is to deny the offender access to property in a form and
to a degree commensurate with his offense. 229
Not all retributivists are pure Kantians, 230 of course; but the
general conception of punishment as justified only in response to a
culpable criminal offense objectively determined by reference to the
nature of that offense forms a common core. 231 Herbert Morris, for
example, famously explained crime as inflicting an imbalance in the
allocation of privileges and burdens central to a well-functioning
society. 232 In his view, punishment should force the offender to
relinquish the benefits and assume the burdens imposed by the
offense. 233 Elsewhere, Morris advances a "Paternalistic Theory of
Punishment," arguing that punishment should attend to the moral
development of the offender. 234 While he allows that paternalistic
punishment is "generally recognized as deprivation," he maintains
that this is an objective constraint, such that punishment remains
"punishment" even if the wrongdoer "desire[s] punishment."235
Like Kant, John Rawls connects crime to moral rules, and
argues that rational persons in the original position will agree that a
229. Other punishments suggested by Kant share this same intuitive appeal. For example,
the punishment for murder is death. KANT, supra note 14, at 106. Others are more elusive. See,
e.g., id. at 130 ("The punishment for rape and pederasty is castration ... that for bestiality,
permanent expulsion from civil society, since the criminal has made himself unworthy of human
society."). Other crimes appear anachronistic. See, e.g., id. at 108-09 (providing excuses for
mothers who kill illegitimate children and killings perpetrated during duels). That these
punishments may seem odd, anachronistic, or culturally bound is no criticism of the theory,
however, because the contradiction posed by any maxim of action is in most cases determined by
reference to contingent social and legal commitments. See supra note 215.
230. This category includes many politicians, pundits, practitioners, and others who claim
the mantle of retributivism. The sad fact is that many of these folks are not really retributivists
at all. Rather, they mine moral outrage to justify ever more severe punishments that are hard if
not impossible to justify under any traditional theory of punishment, including retributivism.
This author shares in the unapologetic belief that we ought not endorse or accept individual
sentences or a system of criminal punishments that cannot be justified by a coherent and
persuasive theory of criminal law and punishment. Therefore, any claim that our current
punitive practices do not conform, in even a rough way, to the terms and dictates of retributivism
is a non sequitur in the present context. Here, the questions at issue are whether the subjectivist
critique exposes a core incoherence in retributivism or whether subjectivism offers a superior
theory of criminal punishment. The answer to both questions is definitively "no."
231. F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 66 (1981) (describing just deserts
theory); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 51 (1976); see also
MOORE, supra note 122, at 84-92, 111.
232. HERBERT MORRIS, Persons and Punishment, in ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 31, 34-35
(1979).
233. For a criticism of this view, see Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting
Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1660-61 (1992), and David Dolinko,
Some Thoughts about Retributivism, 101 ETHICS 537, 545-49 (1991).
234. Morris, supra note 186.
235. Id. at 264.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:6:1619
system of rules for public conduct is necessary, but must conform to
basic principles of legality, including objectivity and prospectivity as
constraints on punishment. 236
George Fletcher "readily accept[s]" the proposition that
"punishment ought to be imposed according to desert."2 37 While his
analysis of desert entails a subjective component of culpability, he too
maintains that punishment ought to respect the offender as an end in
himself rather than rendering him a means to social ends. 238 Fletcher
specifically rejects the proposition that "punishment" must be
experienced as painful by the offender on whom it is inflicted. 239
While not a pure retributivist, H.LA. Hart allows that
punishment "must involve pain or other consequences normally
considered unpleasant."240 However, as George Fletcher points out,
this is an objective, or at least intersubjective, and not a subjective
standard.241 So, a masochist who enjoys confinement or a homeless
man seeking incarceration so he can escape the elements are both
"punished" even if their imprisonment is subjectively pleasurable or
welcomed, so long as incarceration is normally considered painful or
unpleasant.242
236. RAWLS, supra note 205, at 241, 314-15, 575-76. Sharon Dolovich provides a more
elaborate account of a Rawlsian approach to punishment than Rawls ever did in Legitimate
Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 307 (2004). Markel and Flanders have
a different approach that also reflects shades of Rawls. See Markel & Flanders, supra note 1
(distinguishing between comprehensive and political conceptions of retributive justice); see also
RAWLS, supra note 205, at 10 (arguing that punishment must be defined objectively as a
restraint on liberty); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955); Walker, supra
note 42, at 534-36 (describing a "Rawlsian" moment of reasoning from the original position).
237. FLETCHER, supra note 190, at 459-60.
238. Id. at 461, 505-14.
239. FLETCHER, supra note 141, at 227-28. As Fletcher points out, the rise of imprisonment
as the main form of state-sanctioned punishment opens a space of ambiguity between criminal
theory and penal practice. Id. at 226.
240. HART, supra note 120, at 4. Hart's general approach relies on utilitarian considerations
when justifying systems of punishment and retributive grounds when addressing questions of
distribution. Id. at 5-11. Kent Greenawalt offers a similar definition of punishment as involving
"designedly unpleasant consequences" which "most people would wish to avoid." Greenawalt,
supra note 141, at 343-44.
241. FLETCHER, supra note 141, at 228; see also HART, supra note 120, at 19-20, 24-25
(rejecting on various grounds subjective approaches to punishment); Kolber, supra note 1, at 215
(recognizing that Hart defines punishment objectively). But see Kolber, supra note 11, at 34
(acknowledging that "victim subjective experiences are generally relevant").
242. FLETCHER, supra note 141, at 228. Fletcher's discussion neatly disposes of any
normative significance that can be drawn from 0. Henry's famous story The Cop and the
Anthem, in which the homeless protagonist goes to great lengths to get himself incarcerated,
where he hopes he will be warm, fed, and relatively safe. Kolber, supra note 6, at 1580 n.42
(citing 0. HENRY, The Cop and the Anthem, in THE RANSOM OF RED CHIEF AND OTHER 0. HENRY
STORIES FOR BOYS 143, 143 (Franklin J. Mathiews ed., 1918)); see also Kolber, supra note 1, at
205 ("Even though his liberty will be restricted when caught, he is not retributively punished
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In his influential reconstruction of retributivism, Joel Feinberg
defines punishment as "authoritative deprivations,"243 which, qua
punishments, provide a material and symbolic medium for the
expression of social condemnation. 2 4 4 Feinberg recognizes that in order
for punishment to express that condemnation, it must constitute "hard
treatment." However, he is clear that it is "the treatment itself [which]
expresses condemnation," and that method is what carries meaning,
whether the state is "beheading a nobleman, hanging a yeoman, [or]
burning a heretic."245 Nothing in Feinberg's account of punishment
suggests that the public social expression of punishment is bound to
the individual subjective experiences of the punished.246 Quite to the
contrary, he unequivocally rejects the notion that "the wicked should
suffer pain in exact proportion to their turpitude" as "incoherent," in
part because it would lead to absurd results with which we are
familiar, including punishing "some petty larcenies ... more severely
than some murders."247 What allows punishment to express official
condemnation in Feinberg's view is its intersubjective status as "hard
treatment," not the subjective experiences of those punished.248 This
view recently was persuasively amplified by Dan Markel and Chad
Flanders.249 By contrast, the subjectivist approach credited to
retributivists by Kolber and Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur makes
punishment a "private language," nullifying its communicative
potential. 250
when he is subsequently imprisoned, nor are his real-life counterparts. It is simply implausible
that a person can be criminally culpable and thereby deserve to receive treatment that the
offender affirmatively desires.").
243. FEINBERG, supra note 20, at 97-98.
244. Id. at 98-100.
245. Id.; see also Markel & Flanders, supra note 1, at 107 ("[R]etributive punishment . . .
serves as an attempt to communicate to the offender society's condemnation."); Dan Kahan,
What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 593 (1996) (arguing that
"[p]unishment ... is a special convention that signifies [society's] moral condemnation" of the
offender).
246. FEINBERG, supra note 20, at 100. For example, Feinberg analogizes punishment as a
symbolic idiom for condemnation to champagne as a symbolic idiom for celebration. Id. It is hard
to see how the message of Ron Santo's popping the cork on a bottle of champagne after the Cubs
win the World Series would be muddied for viewers if Santo actually hated the stuff.
247. Id. at 116-18. But see Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1077 (concluding that a
"thoroughgoing expressivist theory that punishment involves only considerations of such
disapproval would be unaffected by the phenomena we have emphasized"); Kolber, supra note 1,
at 208-10 (claiming that expressivists must link symbolic semantics to profane subjective
experiences). These arguments are addressed infra Part IV.B.
248. FEINBERG, supra note 20, at 118.
249. See generally Markel & Flanders, supra note 1.




Carlos Nino also defines punishment in objective terms as
"intentional deprivation of a person's normally recognized rights by
official institutions" 251 justified by the commission of a crime.252 While
Nino's consent-based conception of punishment 253 is not purely
retributive, his description of punishment in objective terms reflects
his respect for basic Kantian commitments to legality, culpability, and
respecting offenders as ends in themselves, which form the corpus of
retributive theory. 254
Jean Hampton's theory of punishment as moral education
provides yet another approach to punishment, which, out of respect for
retributive principles, justifies punishment on objective moral
grounds. 255 In Hampton's view, a just theory of punishment must
respect the moral freedom of offenders. 256 While punishment may have
a secondary role in providing nonmoral reasons for conformance with
law, its primary justification is as a marker at the border of public
morality defined by law and a locus for moral education of the offender
and the community. 257 Elsewhere, Hampton also argues that crime
asserts an unjust claim of entitlement by the criminal and
diminishment of his victim's moral status.258 In these circumstances,
punishment provides public affirmation of the victim's worth. In
Hampton's view, both approaches require distinguishing
"punishment," which she defines as "disruption of the freedom to
pursue the satisfaction of one's desires," from the subjective
experience of punishment, which may or may not entail "pain."25 9
251. Nino, supra note 20, at 94.
252. Id. at 102-03.
253. Nino argues that punishment systems and punishment in individual cases represent a
disparity in the distribution of public burdens and benefits that can only be justified by reference
to consent. Culpability for a crime, in his view, entails consensual loss of immunity from
punishment. Id.
254. Id. at 96-97, 102-03, 107-08.
255. See generally Hampton, supra note 20.
256. But see Deirdre Golash, The Retributive Paradox, 54 ANALYSIS 72, 73-78 (1994)
(providing a pithy, if not entirely persuasive, critique of Hampton's theory).
257. See Hampton, supra note 20, at 117-19 (describing the moral education theory as
concerned less with punishment for societal purposes and more with benefiting the offender with
moral knowledge and freedom to autonomously correct her future behavior).
258. Hampton, supra note 233, at 1665-85; see also Bronsteen, supra note 203, at 1151
(citing unpublished data gathered by Kenworthey Bilz supporting Hampton's view). But see
Walker, supra note 42, at 531-32.
259. Hampton, supra note 20, at 128-29. Hampton offers the example of a physician
convicted of Medicare fraud who is sentenced to community service in a state clinic. Id. at 128.
As she points out, attending to the sick need neither be painful nor unpleasant for the physician
for his sentence to constitute "punishment" so long as his freedom is constrained and that
constraint entails a moral lesson. Id.
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Robert Nozick describes two distinct but interrelated
approaches to retributivism, one teleological and the other not.2 60 Both
center on the communicative potential of punishment as a path to
reform. Teleological retributivists care deeply about the success of a
punishment as a method of communication, but as Nozick points out,
full faith to that goal requires the same objective approach to
punishment bound to culpability for a crime central to nonteleological
retributivism. 261
As this brief survey of the field reveals, the equivocation
between suffering and punishment upon which the subjectivist
critique of retributivism depends reflects an essential
misunderstanding of mainline retributivism. Most serious and
sophisticated theories of retributive justice are objective rather than
subjective; they are not driven by revenge or the desire to inflict
suffering;262 and they therefore do not focus on returning suffering for
harm. 2 6 3 To the contrary, retributivists are, or should be, committed to
rejecting the subjectivist view that punishment requires inflicting
subjective disvalue precisely because to do otherwise would be to make
punishment part of a hedonic economy, and therefore put justice at
the whim of instrumental considerations. 2 6 4
This does not mean that punishment cannot cause suffering.265
Neither does it ignore the fact that most punishments are wholly
260. NOZICK, supra note 128, at 363-80.
261. Id. at 374-80.
262. See, e.g., Dan Markel, State Be Not Proud, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 411-13
(2005) (critiquing courts and commentators who make this conflation between retributive justice
and vengeance).
263. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 190, at 417 (proposing that " 'retribution' is not in itself
an argument for making criminals suffer," but rather a means for offenders to correct the societal
imbalance caused by criminal behavior); Markel, supra note 262, at 411-13, 437-38 (arguing
that the purpose of punishment is not revenge); Morris, supra note 186, at 270 (positing that
retributivists reject "like for like" punishment on moral grounds).
264. See Berman, supra note 25, at 8-9, 27-28 (categorizing the retributivist view as
recognizing the "intrinsic value in the suffering of wrongdoers" rather than focusing on the value
attributed to punishment by the plurality).
265. As Thomas Hill points out, in the ideal case an offender would experience guilt and
moral suffering. Hill, supra note 125, at 414-23. As a solution for a race of devils, however,
punishment under law is not defined or justified by the goal of inflicting guilt or moral suffering.
Gray, NoExcuse, supra note 228, at 1081. First, organizing a public response to crime around the
project of inspiring spontaneous subjective states would raise serious conceptional and practical
concerns. Id. at 1048-51, 1054-55, 1062-64. Second, guilt and moral suffering are subjective and
matters of private conscience. KANT, supra note 14, at 106. By contrast, punishment under law is
a public matter, which as a practice maintains that only "the law of retribution (ius talionis-it
being understood, of course, that this is applied by a court (not by your private judgment)--can
specify definitely the quality and the quantity of punishment." Id. To lump this sort of suffering
in with suffering of concern for subjectivist critics would repeat the core equivocation exposed in
this Article.
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undesirable and do cause most of those punished to suffer, at least to
some degree. Rather, the point is that the subjective suffering of a
particular offender is neither sufficient nor necessary to the
justification, measure, or description of punishment for retributivists.
To the contrary, punishment for retributivists is, or ought to be,
justified, measured, and described solely in objective or perhaps
intersubjective terms by reference to the offender's culpability in a
crime.266
The suffering experienced by a particular offender subjected to
the punishment he objectively deserves is therefore incidental, and
retributivists bear no responsibility for justifying that suffering. As
has been emphasized here, this does not mean that subjective
experiences of suffering are without moral or practical significance.
For example, suffering may be an important factor in the exercise of
mercy. Suffering may also be an important consideration for penal
technologists charged with the practical task of executing objectively
justified sentences. However, it is a mistake to conflate the normative
concept "punishment" with suffering as a contingent effect. 267
Retributivism and other objectivist theories of punishment are
attractive in large part because they are robust enough to make that
distinction whereas subjectivism is not.
Closer consideration of treatments of proportionality in the
subjectivist literature reveals a different but related concern. Much if
not all of the subjectivist critique of retributivism is driven by the
commitment to comparative proportionality: like cases ought to be
treated alike. Kolber's argument from The Subjective Experience of
Punishment outlined in Part III.B provides one example, but
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur also rely explicitly on comparative
proportionality in their work.268 For retributivists, however, the
commitment to comparative proportionality is wholly derivative of the
commitment to objective proportionality: that the punishment should
fit the crime. 269
As Joel Feinberg has pointed out, from a retributive point of
view, most claims of comparative injustice rise or fall depending on
266. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *11-20 (requiring proportionality of
punishment); NOZICK, supra note 128, at 363-65 (providing an objective formula for calculating
the amount of punishment deserved by the degree of wrongness and the offender's
responsibility).
267. FEINBERG, supra note 20, at 116-18.
268. See Bronsteen et al., supra note 3, at 1465-67, 1481 (arguing the importance of
proportionality in punishment and the need to reform the criminal justice system to reflect that
importance).
269. See MOORE, supra note 122, at 90-91 (proposing that while retributivism prefers that
"[]ike cases ... be treated alike," it requires that punishment match desert).
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whether there is an underlying claim of noncomparative injustice.270
For example, if an offender complains that his sentence is
comparatively longer than his cellmate's sentence, that complaint only
has merit if that comparison reveals an element of arbitrariness or
objective unfairness in his sentence. 271 Deborah Hellman has made
this point at length, arguing that discrimination is unjust only if
objectively unjustified. 272 Furthermore, inverting the order of priority
between objective and comparative conceptions of proportionality
would lead to results far more absurd than those advanced by the
subjectivist critique. For example, if the sole measure of justice was
comparative proportionality, then there would be no reason to object
to infliction of the death penalty for minor traffic violations so long as
all similarly situated offenders were put to death.273
Just as retributivists are committed to measure punishment
objectively rather than subjectively, so too are they committed to
justify punishment on the basis of objective rather than comparative
proportionality. 274 To the extent the subjectivist critique of
retributivism depends on a different reading of the nature and role of
270. Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, supra note 68, at 300-01, 311-13, 318-19.
271. Id. at 311-13, 318-19.
272. See generally DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? (2008).
273. See Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, supra note 68, at 311 (arguing that this analogy
proves that "criminal desert is in part noncomparative," because it is possible to have a system
where all punishments are unjust due to unreasonable severity).
274. While far from determinative in the present discussion, it is worth noting that the
Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence appears to endorse an objective rather than
subjective account of "punishment." In In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890), the Court
confirmed that particularly barbaric punishments, such as disembowelment, are prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment because "they involve torture or a lingering death" and are therefore
"inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." While it is not
unreasonable to think that this "something more" is pain, the Court "has never invalidated a
State's chosen procedure for carrying out a sentence of death as the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment," Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 48 (2008), and when asked to rule on the
constitutionality of electrocution on particularly gruesome facts, the Court held that "[t]he
cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the
method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to
extinguish life humanely," Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947). When
asked to determine the constitutionality of imposing death on mentally impaired and juvenile
offenders in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568-74 (2005) and again in Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 317-21 (2002), the Court again adopted an objective view, focusing its attention on the
moral culpability of these agents and our "evolving standards of decency," rather than the unique
suffering members of these classes of offender might experience. See also Graham v. Florida, 130
S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (adopting the same approach in holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
sentencing juvenile offenders to life in prison without the possibility of release). However, one
should not make too much of the Court's record in these matters. The Court has never squarely
addressed the question whether punishment is suffering, and as a consequence is often less than
clear on where it stands.
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retributivism's commitment to proportionality, that critique is a non
sequitur.
Take for example, one of Kolber's arguments in The
Comparative Nature of Punishment. Imagine two people who
perpetrate the same crime. For a retributivist, the punishment for
that crime is determined objectively by reference to an offender's
desert. Again by hypothesis, let us assume that the objectively proper
sentence for the crimes committed here is five years' imprisonment.
This assessment is a function of objective proportionality. That is, the
five years is the punishment that is properly proportionate to the
crime. Kolber asks us to imagine that one of the offenders commits his
crime while in government quarantine that imposes upon him
conditions that are in all material respects identical to the conditions
he will face in prison. Kolber asserts that, in these circumstances,
"[t]he proportionalist must make the strange claim that the person in
quarantine needs to be given especially limited liberties in prison, not
to obtain additional deterrence, but simply in order to give him a
sentence that is equal to that of everyone else who does not have
especially restricted baseline liberties."275 That is only true if the
proportionalist in question believes that comparative proportionality
carries independent normative obligations, trumps objective
proportionality, or both.
B. Five Objections to Objective Accounts of Punishment
Contemporary subjectivists have addressed the retributivist
commitment to justify and measure punishment objectively. 276 For
example, Kolber cites John Rawls for the proposition that
"punishment" constitutes not "suffering," but "legal[] deprivat[ion] of
some of the normal rights of a citizen." 277 Kolber, whose views on these
points Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur endorse,278 denies the
persuasiveness of this approach to punishment for two principal
reasons. First, he contends that defining and justifying punishment in
objective terms fails to take account of subjective experiences of
275. Kolber, supra note 6, at 1591.
276. See, e.g., Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1068-74 (describing retributivist approaches
to punishment as consistently objective); Kolber, supra note 6, at 1585-94 (stating that "the
currency of punishment is understood in objective terms."). But see Kolber, supra note 1, at 203-
08 (acknowledging that while valuing objectivity, for punishment to be successful, the offender
must have some subjective awareness).
277. Kolber, supra note 1, at 203 (quoting RAWLS, supra note 205, at 10).
278. See Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1068-69, 1072 n.166, for a discussion of
accounting for subjectivity when analyzing punishment from a retributivist perspective.
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punishment.279 That claim seems question-begging, and so it is; a
point made in Parts III and IV.A. Second, he suggests five reasons
why a purely objective account of punishment would be
"unattractive."280 Below, each of these is addressed in turn.
1. "Contrary to Ordinary Understanding of Severity"
Kolber contends that objective accounts of punishment
"deviate[] from our commonsense intuitions about why we would not
want to be punished."281 He acknowledges that "this is hardly a
knockdown objection,"282 and rightly so. First, appeals to intuition are
always on shaky ground in the absence of some empirical foundation;
we simply may not share the same intuitions.283 Second, the purpose
of criminal punishment theory is precisely to challenge common
intuitions in order to determine the merits of those dispositions.284 It
therefore begs the question to credit commonsense intuitions,
particularly if they run counter to a long tradition of objectivist
theory.285 Finally, appeals to these intuitions are entirely irrelevant to
an argument that purports to address retributivism on its own
grounds. These "commonsense intuitions about why we would not
want to be punished"286 appeal to a hedonic economy familiar from
utilitarian analysis,287 where the degree of antipathy for a particular
punishment might be important, say for evaluating deterrent
potential.288 For good reasons, only some of which are explored here,
many retributivists reject that appeal and the intuitions that
underwrite it.289 For retributivists, desert, not idiosyncratic aversion,
279. Kolber, supra note 1, at 196-98.
280. Id. at 203; see also Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1069 (endorsing Kolber's five
arguments as their own).
281. Kolber, supra note 1, at 203; see also Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1068, 1072 n.166
(agreeing with Kolber's assertion).
282. Kolber, supra note 1, at 203.
283. See Golash, supra note 256, at 73 (pointing out that appeals to intuition are
"unsatisfactory" in part "because some have this intuition while others don't").
284. See Dolinko, supra note 233, at 557-58.
285. Id.
286. Kolber, supra note 1, at 203.
287. See Hampton, supra note 20, at 115-18 (clarifying the border between utilitarian and
retributive theories of punishment by reference to the role of punishment in producing pain,
which provides a "nonmoral" reason for compliance with law).
288. As an example, consider Kolber's discussion of "libertiles." Kolber, supra note 6, at
1567-69. To conceive of liberty as quantified according to the comparative value of that liberty to
an agent or the fruits accrued through exploitation of that liberty collapses deontological
accounts of justice and liberty into utilitarianism without argument or justification.
289. KANT, supra note 14, at 105; see also Berman, supra note 25 (exploring the theoretical
difficulties that befall suffering-focused retributivists).
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is the central feature of just punishment. That punishment is
unwanted, why, and how much, neither makes punishment
"punishment," nor justifies it as punishment. To claim otherwise is to
switch fields from objectivism to subjectivism, again begging the
question.290
2. "Awareness Requirement"
Kolber also argues that for an imposition on liberty to
constitute "punishment," an offender must be aware that he is being
punished. 291 He offers two examples to support this claim. First, he
asks us to imagine an offender sentenced to home confinement who,
during the appointed period, is locked inside his home, but for reasons
of his own decides to stay at home and as a consequence is blissfully
unaware that he is serving his sentence.292 Second, Kolber posits an
offender who falls into a coma during his incarceration, and therefore
is not cognizant of anything, much less his imprisonment. 293 Kolber
maintains that neither the naif nor the comatose prisoner is punished
because neither is aware of his punishment.
Again, it is not clear that Kolber's intuitions on this point are
either common or tied to bedrock conceptions of justice. For example,
Jean Hampton, whom he cites, 294 holds precisely the opposite view.295
Pressing the coma example a bit further suggests that Hampton has
the better view. Imagine that an offender sentenced to ten years'
imprisonment falls into a coma during his first year of incarceration
and wakes up during his last. Would the state have a credible claim
that his years in the coma cannot be counted toward his time served
and that his sentence must therefore be extended accordingly? It is
hard to see how. Appeals to subjective experience would beg the
question, and also would open the door to a host of absurdities. For
example, in terms of awareness there is no clear distinction between
coma and deep sleep. If awareness is a necessary feature of
punishment, and Kolber is taken seriously on this point, then it
follows that, over the course of a ten-year term of imprisonment, a
prisoner who sleeps on average nine hours a day is punished
substantially less-152 days-than one who sleeps on average eight
290. KANT, supra note 14, at 105.
291. Kolber, supra note 1, at 203-04; see also Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1069
(adopting this argument).
292. Kolber, supra note 1, at 204.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 209 n.72.
295. See supra notes 255-259 and accompanying text.
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hours a day. Kolber-and Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur because
they ally themselves with Kolber's argument on this point-therefore
seems committed to the view that offenders must be denied timely
release if they are good sleepers. In a battle among intuitions, this is
tough ground to defend.
Fortunately, there is no need for present purposes to see this
war of intuitions to its bloody conclusion. There is certainly something
to the proposition that retributivists attach importance to awareness
of both the punishment and the reason for punishment. 296 This is
reflected in the substantive law on the death penalty, which prohibits
executing defendants who are incapable of understanding the nature
of and reasons for their punishment. 297 However, "knowledge" does not
imply "suffering." Therefore, even if knowledge is required for
punishment to be "punishment," Kolber's and Bronsteen, Buccafusco,
and Masur's core claim, that suffering or some infliction of subjective
disvalue is necessary for a punishment to constitute "punishment,"
does not follow. 29 8 A brief example helps to make the point.
Imagine an offender who is initially resistant to his
incarceration but over the course of several years faces the reality of
his crime, assumes full responsibility, and comes to accept his
incarceration as just, deserved, and an opportunity for personal
reform. For the remainder of his sentence he is a model prisoner. He
pursues an education, counsels fellow prisoners, makes amends with
his victims, and seizes every opportunity to do good. During this
period, our model prisoner achieves a deep sense of peace and
contentment and comes to believe not only that his incarceration is
deserved, but that it is right, good for him, the best thing that could
have happened, and the cause of a much higher baseline of subjective
utility than he ever would have experienced had he not been
incarcerated. Even if knowledge is a necessary criterion of
punishment, we are not barred from celebrating this personal
blossoming. Retributivism certainly does not introduce any obstacle.
To the contrary, while reformation is not a goal or justification of
punishment, Kant and others hold in highest regard those who accept
punishment as a perfection of their autonomy. 299
296. NOZICK, supra note 128, at 368; Morris, supra note 186, at 264.
297. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 954-60 (2007); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,
401 (1986); see also R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 16-35 (1986).
298. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 141, at 228; Hampton, supra note 20, at 128-29.
299. KANT, supra note 14, at 107; see also MORRIS, supra note 232, at 48-49; NOZICK, supra
note 128, at 370-80; Hill, supra note 125, at 439.
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Not so if "the subjective disutility of punishment is . .. largely
or entirely the punishment itself."300 If this foundational premise of
the subjectivist critique is maintained, then prison officials are obliged
to inflict additional hardship on offenders who pursue reformation and
come to experience their incarceration as positive because they suffer
less than their bitter and taciturn peers. 301 That call to bring out the
hot pincers and molten lead 302 in order to inflict subjective disutility
on the most virtuous and honorable offenders can only be regarded as
perverse from a retributive point of view because it requires inflicting
undeserved harm.
3. "Selecting Liberties to Lose"
Kolber further asserts that "one must consider subjective
responses to punishment when deciding which liberty deprivations to
use as punishment." 303 On his view, the unacceptable alternative is
that a particular deprivation of liberty may not be sufficiently
"aversive" to the offender to constitute punishment.304
For retributivists, punishment may be imposed only if, and to
the degree, it is deserved. If the correct punishment is inflicted, and
the offender embraces that punishment as his just deserts and an
opportunity for personal reform that makes him happier, more
content, and more fulfilled than he ever could have been otherwise,
then it would be the grossest perversion of retributivist theory to
argue that additional hard treatment that is not deserved must be
inflicted solely for the purpose of achieving a threshold of subjective
aversion. That result does not change if, for reasons of his own or
because he is a masochist, a particular offender experiences just
punishment as a source of pleasure.305
300. Kolber, supra note 1, at 212; see also Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1037-38, 1068-
70.
301. It is the logical implication from Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur's discussion that the
same would be true of an offender who "views incarceration as a badge of honor." See Bronsteen
et al., supra note 1, at 1077 (discussing offender perception within the context of expressive
theories).
302. FOUCAULT, supra note 35, at 3-6.
303. Kolber, supra note 1, at 204 (emphasis added). Again, Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and
Masur fully endorse Kolber's views on this point. Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1068-69.
304. Kolber, supra note 1, at 204, 215.
305. See FLETCHER, supra note 141, at 228 (noting that substance of punishment is "always
whether the sanction is typically or characteristically onerous, not whether the sanction is
experienced as punishment in the particular case").
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4. "Nonarbitrary Severity Determinations"
As additional evidence that punishment requires suffering or
some other form of reduction in subjective utility, Kolber claims that
"[t]hose who defend an objective account of punishment must be able
to describe why some punishments are more severe than others."306 At
the risk of being repetitive, this too reflects a basic misunderstanding
not only of retributivism but of punishment theory generally. The
basic sufficiency criteria for all theories of punishment are justifying
punishment generally and punishment inflicted in particular cases
specifically. There is no requirement for describing an ordinal array of
punishments or pinpointing where on such a scale any particular
punishment might fall, which is precisely what Kolber requires by
demanding an account of "why some punishments are more severe
than others."307 Retributivism carries its burden of justifying
punishment in general and in specific cases by reference to culpable
criminal conduct. Because those selections are not in any way
"arbitrary,"308 questions engaging idiosyncratic views on which of two
punishments imposed in response to different crimes is the more
severe are non sequiturs.
5. "Objective Punishment Calibration"
Kolber's final argument for the proposition that punishment
cannot be accounted for objectively but must be defined by subjective
experiences of suffering asserts that retributivists cannot "eliminate
the obligation to engage in complicated, counterintuitive punishment
calculations."309 Kolber does not specify what "complicated,
counterintuitive punishment calculations" he has in mind. However,
the notion that, where crime is defined as the abuse of liberty, the
306. Kolber, supra note 1, at 205; see also Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1070-73 (arguing
that adaptive capacities undermine the balancing of desert and punishment in pure
retributivism).
307. Kolber, supra note 1, at 205; see HART, supra note 120, at 11 (discussing the
"distribution" of punishment as who may be punished and by how much); Murphy, Does Kant,
supra note 196, at 530 (discussing Kant's views on proportionality as balancing punishment
"against the offense for which [it] is administered"); see also Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice,
supra note 68, at 311 (arguing that criminal desert is necessarily in part noncomparative).
Feinberg considers the vivid example of a system where "beheading and disembowelment
became the standard punishment for overtime parking . . . ." Id. As he points out, such a
punishment is objectively unjust, and "[mioreover, it would be unjust even if it were the mildest
penalty in the whole system of criminal law, with more serious offenses punished with
proportionately greater severity still . . . ." Id.
308. Kolber, supra note 1, at 235.
309. Id. at 207; see also Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1069 (adopting this argument).
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proper punishment is to impose a constraint on the very liberty
abused is hardly counterintuitive. It certainly has more intuitive
appeal than the conclusion that rich and sensitive offenders should be
treated more delicately than their hardscrabble peers simply because
the rich and sensitive have had the luxury of indulging delicate
sensibilities.
On this point, it is worth a brief return to Kolber's comparative
approach to punishment.310 The comparative account of punishment is
in essence another form of subjectivism, and is therefore equally
vulnerable to earlier arguments. It does, however, raise its own
concerns, which are best analyzed in the context of Kolber's discussion
of objective theories of punishment. There, Kolber rightly recognizes
that many prominent retributivists define punishment objectively,
often in terms of deprivations of liberty. 311 He then argues that even
these theorists must "calibrate punishments for particular offenders"
based on their subjective experiences of punishment measured by
comparing their baselines before and during punishment.312 His
argument is simply that before we can know that we have actually
deprived an offender of liberty, we must know what his baseline of
liberty is. Otherwise, we risk leaving him unpunished.
The easy response to this argument is that it confuses what
objectivists mean by "deprivation" of liberty by adopting without
warrant a subjective metric. 313 This is by now a familiar refrain, but,
to tailor the point for present circumstances, assume that the
objectively justified punishment for an offender's crime is five years'
imprisonment. For an objectivist, the offender will be properly
punished if he is incarcerated for five years-full stop. It simply does
not matter whether that incarceration effects a change in his
subjective satisfaction. To hold the contrary would make the offender's
five-year term not punishment if it was served concurrently with
another sentence because it would not deprive him of any more liberty
than he was already being deprived of by serving his other sentence. It
would also make the five-year term not punishment if it was served
consecutively with another sentence because the offender would be in
exactly the same condition when he woke on the first day of his next
sentence as he was when he went to bed on the eve of his last. The
only solution, if the comparative approach is taken seriously, would be
310. See supra Part II.B.
311. Kolber, supra note 6, at 1585-86.
312. Id. at 1586.
313. Retributivists must accept some portion of the responsibility here for choosing the word
"deprivation," when "constraint" is probably more accurate.
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to inflict additional unjustified hard treatment in order to produce a
further change from baseline. Again, that consequence ought to count
as good reason to be an objectivist rather than a subjectivist when it
comes to justifying and measuring punishment.
There is, however, a deeper problem here. All of Kolber's
arguments for subjectivism depend on his claim that "[u]nder any
plausible conception of liberty, people vary in the amount of liberty
they have." 314 Taken at face value, this observation does not advance
the ball. It is almost tautologically true that those of us on the outside
have more liberty than those in prison, that most women in the
United States have more liberty than most women living under the
Taliban, and, to recall one of Kolber's examples, that a person
kidnapped and taken hostage has less liberty than a person at . . .
well . . . liberty. That is not what Kolber means by "liberty," however.
Kolber's claim is that the amount of liberty we have is calculated by
reference to what we actually do or what we actually have. On this
account, rich people have more liberty than poor people both because
they have more stuff and because that stuff affords them the
opportunity to do more and different things.315 Bill Gates has more
liberty than I do because he has a bigger house and a private airplane
that allows him to head to the Maldives on a lark, whereas I do not.
When Martha Stewart went to prison, "she was deprived of her
liberties to private property to a much greater degree than her fellow
inmates" because she had more stuff on the outside;316 and she was
deprived of her freedom of movement to a much greater degree
because her houses and yards were bigger than those her fellow
prisoners occupied before they were incarcerated. 3 1 7
There are a number of intersecting problems in this account of
liberty. One is a failure to appreciate a distinction central to the
liberal tradition between liberty and license. "Liberty" is not
unfettered license. It is freedom bounded by morality, ethics, and law.
To hold the contrary would be to argue that a prohibition on murder,
say, is an infringement upon liberty when, in fact, it is a precondition
of liberty.318
314. Kolber, supra note 1, at 207; see also Kolber, supra note 6, at 1587 (describing the
variety of baseline states through the analogy of the abducted drug dealer).
315. Kolber, supra note 6, at 1587-89, 1593-94.
316. Id. at 1590.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1590 n.65.
318. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 266, at *40 (arguing that laws, discoverable by
application of reason, and by which "freewill is in some degree regulated and restrained," are
necessary conditions of justice); THOMAs HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 78 (Edwin Curley ed., 1994)
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Kolber's gloss of "liberty" also fails to distinguish between
liberty and the material consequences of exercising or not exercising
liberty.319 If I am at liberty to own a house, but choose not to do so,
then it would be nonsensical for me to complain that a homeowner has
more liberty than I do simply because he exercised his liberty and I
did not. So too would be my complaint that I have less liberty than a
law school classmate who remained in private practice while I chose
the life of a law professor simply because she makes more money and
therefore drives a Maserati and takes luxurious cruises.
Yet a third possible source of confusion is a failure to
distinguish between liberty and questions of distributive justice,
including the practical capacity and opportunity to exploit liberty. 320
There is no doubt, for example, that a child of privilege has the
opportunity to leverage more easily her liberty into material comfort
than does her impoverished peer. However, recognizing distributive
disparities does not entail or support the conclusion that the child of
privilege has greater liberty than the child of poverty because both,
strictly speaking, are at liberty to pursue the same material or
existential goals.321 That we might regard the fact that one will have
an easier time of it than the other as an injustice does not complicate
the distinction between liberty and material rewards of liberty, and
certainly does not provide authority to use criminal punishment "to
rectify preexisting unjust distributions in society."322
The collection of these confusions is another iteration of the
basic category mistake at the heart of the subjectivist critique: a
failure to recognize the difference between the normative concept of
punishment and its contingent effects, including the subjective
experiences of offenders. Here the mistake is to conflate the normative
concept of liberty with its material effects, including wealth. If the
subjectivist critique of retributivism comes down to an accusation that
(determining that reason pushes individuals toward societal obligations or "peace" in order to
protect individual liberty from all others in society who are also driven by "passions"); Immanuel
Kant, Idea for A Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent (1784), reprinted in KANT:
POLITICAL WRITINGS 41, 46-48 (Hans Reiss ed., 1991) (positing that freewill "unconsciously
promote[s] an end," whereby being forced to relinquish freewill ensures lasting freewill for all);
KANT, supra note 14, at 89-90 (proposing that without law, "individual human beings, peoples,
and states can never be secure against violence from one another," thereby requiring prohibitions
on behavior ultimately to protect individual freedom); KANT, RELIGION, supra note 217, at 104-
05 (stating that law is required to contain the private feelings of individuals).
319. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 205, at 201-05 (clarifying "the meaning of the priority of
liberty" and the loss thereof).
320. Kolber, supra note 6, at 1587-89, 1593-94.
321. Dan Markel and Chad Flanders make a similar point. See Markel & Flanders, supra
note 1, at 170-78.
322. Kolber, supra note 1, at 232.
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retributivists fail to make the same conceptual mistakes, then that is
hardly persuasive.
C. The Consequences of Subjectivism
The subjectivist critique of retributivism proceeds from an
indefensible premise: that punishment is suffering. This critique
depends upon importing this poison pill into objective retributive
theories and then extrapolating absurd or perverse consequences. Up
to this point, this Part has argued that the initial move, attribution of
the claim that punishment is suffering to retributivism, can and
should be resisted by retributivists. Kolber and Bronsteen,
Buccafusco, and Masur also have a positive agenda, built around the
claim that subjective accounts of suffering ought to matter when
determining, measuring, and justifying punishment.323 Part III
suggested that this positive agenda is incoherent, at least because it
cannot and does not distinguish crime from punishment. As Lon
Fuller pointed out in another context, assertions that intellectual
clarity is wanting often are married to claims of harmful effect. 324
Subjectivism certainly treads this path. This Section returns to this
catalogue of horribles to argue that the perverse results Kolber
deploys as reductio ad absurdum against retributivism derive from the
subjectivism he shares with Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, not
from retributivism or other objective theories of punishment. Those
unpalatable consequences therefore count as good reasons to reject not
retributivism, but the subjective approaches to punishment these
scholars are promoting.
One of the most compelling counterintuitive results that Kolber
purports to draw against retributivism is that the commitment to
proportionality in punishment requires inflicting objectively less
severe punishment on the wealthy and soft because they are more
sensitive and have more to lose.3 2 5 Kolber contends that this result
offends our moral intuitions, and therefore should lead us to reject
retributivism. 326 There is no doubt that punishing differently two
323. See Bronsteen et al., supra note 3, at 1463-67 (arguing that evidence of prisoners'
adaptability should inform the theory and practice of punishment); Bronsteen et al., supra note
139, at 1641 ("[G]overnments and policymakers should adopt a decision procedure based upon
subjective well-being . , . ."); Kolber, supra note 11, at 4 ("If we seek to have justified criminal
justice practices, then we need to consider subjective experience more than we do now.").
324. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 630, 631 (1958).
325. Kolber, supra note 6, at 1569-70; Kolber, supra note 1, at 186-87.
326. Kolber, supra note 6, at 1569-70.
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offenders who commit the same crime based on existential conditions
that do not bear on their culpability offends strong justice intuitions.
That offense is all the worse if those conditions reflect background
distributive injustice. 327 As is by now clear, however, the intuitions
offended are retributivist, and reveal objective, not comparative,
disproportion. 32 8 The retributivist commitment to justify and measure
punishment objectively by reference to culpability in crime without
regard to hedonic economies is attractive precisely because it avoids
these sorts of results. Only if one endorses the subjectivist claim that
"the subjective disutility of punishment . .. is largely or entirely the
punishment itself' 329 does one face the prospect of basing punishment
determinations on considerations other than desert. It follows that
subjectivism, not objectivist retributivism, is the theory of punishment
which bears the burden of justifying these perverse consequences.
Another disturbing consequence of defining punishment in
subjective terms as suffering or subjective disutility is that it appears
to endorse severe injustices in our current sentencing practices. Take
for example the intersection of race, poverty, and crack cocaine. The
statistics place beyond contest the simple fact that, on average, black
children and juveniles from poor backgrounds enjoy a lower standard
of living, worse nutrition, fewer educational opportunities, and are far
more likely to have early interactions with the criminal justice system
as compared to their white, middle-class peers. 330 Parallel statistics
bear out the raw fact that black persons from poor backgrounds are
disproportionately affected by the disparity between sentencing
practices for crack cocaine offenses and those for powder cocaine.331
The coordinate impact of these phenomena on both the likelihood of
punishment and the severity (defined objectively) of punishment
imposed on non-violent, young, black, drug offenders is staggering and
327. For a useful discussion of the relationship between criminal justice and distributive
justice, see Stuart P. Green, Hard Times, Hard Time: Retributive Justice for Unjustly
Disadvantaged Offenders, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1511732.
328. Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, supra note 68, at 300-01, 311-13.
329. Kolber, supra note 1, at 212.
330. See, e.g., Green, supra note 327 (manuscript at 2-5) (explaining that the poor account
for a disproportionately high percentage of crime victims and criminal offenders); OFFICE OF THE
SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUmAN SERVS., YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL ch. 4, http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/youthviolence/toc.html (last
visited Sept. 10, 2010) ("Race is a proxy for other known risk factors-living in poor, single
parent families, doing poorly at school, and being exposed to neighborhood disadvantage, gangs,
violence, and crime.").
331. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, Special Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal
Sentencing Policy (Feb. 1995) [hereinafter Special Report] (recommending that Congress reduce
the 100:1 ratio of sentences imposed for crack and powder cocaine offenses).
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impossible to justify on retributive grounds.332 For retributivists, this
and other facts about our present punishment policy constitute
persistent injustice because the individual sentences are objectively
unjustified and, therefore, so are the broader disparities by which each
of these "[i]njustice[s] become[s] manifest." 333
For those interested in defending race and class disparities in
our criminal justice system evidenced in disparities among sentences
for crack and powder cocaine, subjectivism provides welcome refuge.
According to the logic of the subjectivist critique, lifelong experience
with conditions of poverty and racism means two things. First, poor
black youths enter the criminal justice system at a lower baseline
position of material and environmental comfort as compared to their
white, privileged peers. 334 Second, by virtue of their experiences,
including early contact with the criminal justice system, poor black
youths are more likely to be subjectively tolerant of privation and
somewhat hardened to the threats and realities of incarceration. 3 3 5
Third, those same features likely make poor black youths more prone
to rebound quickly from the initial unhappiness imposed by
incarceration. Therefore, according to the logic of the subjectivist
critique, poor black youths must receive objectively more severe
punishments than their effete white peers in order to achieve the
same quantum of subjective suffering, the same change in
comparative suffering, and the same sustained levels of unhappiness.
Claims that sentences for crack offenses are objectively
disproportionate given the nature of crack offenses as compared to
powder cocaine offenses, and even claims that those disparities eeffect
racist sentencing policy, therefore appear to be irrelevant for
subjectivists. From a subjectivist point of view, the fact that those
disparities disproportionately impact poor black youths actually
counts as good reason for maintaining the disparities. From a
retributivist point of view, this is unconscionable.
332. See Green, supra note 327; Special Report, supra, note 331.
333. Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, supra note 68, at 301.
334. See Kolber, supra note 6, at 1567-69 (discussing how, for example, "[r]ich people have
rights to use particular property that poor people lack," which suggests that rich people have
higher baseline conditions).
335. See Kolber, supra note 1, at 230-31 ("All else being equal, as an empirical matter,
wealthy people are likely to suffer more intensely in prison than those with less wealth who are
placed in the same prison conditions.").
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V. OBJECTIVISM PART II: UTILITARIANISM
The critical agenda of contemporary subjectivists is not
confined to retributivism. These critics also argue that utilitarian
theories of punishment err in defining and justifying punishment on
purely objective grounds and must in practice and theory recognize
and incorporate subjective experiences of punishment. 336 The major
contributors to the current subjectivist literature appear to endorse
utilitarianism as having the best theoretical architecture for justifying
and measuring criminal punishment, so these criticisms are in the
form of friendly amendments rather than condemnation. 337
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to believe that these
amendments are unwelcome. Those reasons are by now familiar. As in
their engagements with retributivism, contemporary subjectivist
critics' discussions of utilitarianism evidence conceptual mistakes that
in some cases reflect a misunderstanding of the core theory.
A. Some Common Utilitarian Themes
Utilitarian approaches to criminal punishment are nearly as
diverse as retributive, but there are four dominant, nonexclusive,
positive goals of punishment cited by most proponents: general
deterrence, specific deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. It is
not at all clear that subjective experiences of punishment have any
normative impact on penal theories justified by pursuit of any of these
four goals.
While goal oriented, incapacitation and rehabilitation bear
some similarity to retributivism in this respect: all three reject
categorically the claim that punishment is suffering. Suffering is
neither an end nor immediate goal of incarceration for purposes of
incapacitation or rehabilitation. Suffering may well be incidental to
the technologies deployed to achieve incarceration or rehabilitation,
but it is incidental. Individual experiences of suffering therefore may
bear on issues of technical penology in incapacitation or rehabilitation
regimes, 338 but do not carry any particular normative weight for the
336. Id. at 219 ("[T]he only way to avoid the obligation to take the subjective experience of
punishment into account is to abolish punishment entirely.").
337. See Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1055-68 (discussing the applications of
subjectivist findings on hedonic adaptation, forecasting, and post-prison effects to utilitarian
theories of punishment); Kolber, supra note 1, at 236 (maintaining that consequentialists are
already "quite receptive to the claim that they are prima facie obligated to take account of actual
or anticipated subjective experiences").
338. See infra Part VI.
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project of justifying punishment practices generally or in particular
cases because suffering is not an essential, much less substantive,
feature of punishment justified by the ends of incapacitation or
rehabilitation. Kolber seconds this point, going so far as to say that "it
is not at all clear that a consequentialist theory of punishment
stripped of its deterrence aim should still even be thought of as a
theory of punishment."3 39 That conclusion only follows, of course, if one
thinks that the infliction of suffering or some other form of subjective
disutility is necessary to make punishment "punishment."
General deterrence is on different footing because, as opposed
to other theories .of punishment, deterrence theory defines and
justifies punishment in terms of suffering.340 Nevertheless, there
seems to be no reason to take much notice of individual experiences of
punishment in a general deterrence regime. General deterrence uses
threats of suffering to raise the risk profile of crime for members of the
general public.341 Assuming that agents refrain from crime only when
the product of risk and severity of punishment outweighs the product
of promise and benefit of crime, general deterrence will still determine
punishment objectively based on demographic assessments of
prospective aversion, not subjectively, based on individual experiences
of suffering among those actually punished. 342
To extend the point, what matters to the general deterrence
theorist is not how a particular offender experiences a punishment or
even how most people will actually experience a punishment. Rather,
the operative factor for general deterrence is the level of suffering
339. Kolber, supra note 1, at 219.
340. JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW, reprinted in THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 365, 395-96 (John Bowring ed., Russell & Russell 1962) (1843).
341. There is good reason to doubt the model of agency implied by this model. See, e.g., David
J. Pyle, The Economic Approach to Crime and Punishment, 6 J. INTERDISC. ECON. 1, 4-8 (1995);
Paul Robinson & John Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules:
At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 951-53 (2003). Present purposes do not
require taking a position in this debate.
342. For an extensive discussion of these timing issues see Markel & Flanders, supra note 1,
and Bronsteen et al., supra note 3. Kolber argues that we should nevertheless factor in the
subjective differences among defenders because offenders sensitive to imprisonment will be more
sensitive to threats of imprisonment while offenders less sensitive to imprisonment will be less
sensitive to threats of imprisonment. Kolber, supra note 1, at 217. This is a dubious claim,
particularly in light of studies cited by Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, supra note 1, at 1041-
45, suggesting that most of us are quite bad at forecasting our actual sensitivities to stimuli. See
also Kolber, supra note 1 at 211 & n.79, 217 (conceding that individuals may not be good
predictors of their future responses to punishment). Setting those issues aside, this response is,
strictly speaking, a non sequitur, both because it addresses specific rather than general
deterrence and because it fails to respect the important line between ex post and ex ante that is
central to deterrence policy and analysis.
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most people expect, ex ante, that they would experience if punished.343
As Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur note, it does not matter if that
assessment is accurate. 344 The currency of general deterrence is, then,
not actual suffering, but imagined suffering determined objectively
across the relevant demographic group. Subjectivist scholars have
argued that titration of suffering on an individual basis is nonetheless
necessary in a general deterrence regime because to do otherwise
would send different messages to different offenders based on their
different experiences with punishment.345 That argument ignores the
logic of general deterrence and entails the same fallacy perpetrated by
Bentham in his defense of excuses, described by Hart as a "spectacular
non sequitur."346
If the goal of punishment is specific deterrence, then subjective
assessments of suffering at first appear to be highly relevant. That
intuition ought not to be indulged uncritically, however. First, this
approach to punishment would endorse the perverse results discussed
above in Parts IV.B. and C. The traditional solution for utilitarians
faced with such objections is to withdraw into a defense of rules. Of
course, that retreat endorses objective justifications of punishment,
setting aside as irrelevant differences in individual suffering. 347
There is a deeper problem here, however, which is revealed in
work by Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur on the phenomenon of
hedonic adaptation. According to studies cited by these authors,
offenders tend to be very poor predictors of the suffering they will
experience if punished.348 The accuracy of those assessments appears
to be no better if informed by experience. So, recidivists tend to
"overestimate" the level of suffering that punishment, measured as
subjective changes in hedonic states, will inflict. 349 This apparent
oddity will be addressed in a moment, but these contributors to the
literature surely ask the right question.
What matters in calibrating punishment in a specific
deterrence regime is not how that punishment actually is experienced,
but predictions of subjective experiences of punishment made
343. It is worth pointing out that the most effective contributors to these perceptions are
likely not the actual, real-time, subjective experiences of prisoners, but a constellation of actual
and purported reports of those experiences. Television shows, movies, media reports, etc., are
probably far more influential contributors to the general deterrence effects of punishment than
the actual experiences of real offenders.
344. Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1060.
345. Id. at 24; Kolber, supra note 1, at 216-18, 218 n.101.
346. HART, supra note 120, at 19.
347. Id.
348. Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1058-62.
349. Id. at 1044.
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prospectively by the offender to be deterred. Thus, even in specific
deterrence regimes, the actual subjective experiences of offenders
assessed contemporaneously or ex post facto are irrelevant to the task
of measuring and justifying punishment.a50 This is not beyond debate,
of course. For example, it may turn out that future brain studies will
reveal that certain subjective experiences of suffering create or
strengthen specific neural pathways implicated in future risk
assessment. In that case, those subjective experiences would be
relevant for predicting offenders' prospective assessments of potential
hedonic change in the face of future opportunities to commit crime. We
are not there yet, of course, and there is good reason to suspect that
we may never get there or, if we do, that the models of agency and
constructions of happiness and suffering endorsed by contemporary
subjectivists will have little or no role to play. As is argued in the next
Section, those reasons have their root in the rather thin descriptions
of suffering and happiness endorsed by Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and
Masur. When considered in light of deeper and more nuanced accounts
of suffering and happiness dominant in the literature on
utilitarianism, it is ever more evident that subjectivism ought to be
rejected as both a critique and as a prescriptive theory of punishment.
B. Utilitarianism and Conceptions of Human Nature
At various points in their arguments, Kolber and Bronsteen,
Buccafusco, and Masur treat all suffering as fungible. 351 This raises
concerns for Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, who rest their
arguments on hedonic adaptation. Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur
report two phenomena which they find interesting and which they
claim raise serious normative and practical challenges to traditional
theories of criminal punishment. The first is that offenders quickly
adapt to incarceration and, within a relatively short period, report
levels of happiness on par with those reported before incarceration. 3 5 2
The second is that those who have been incarcerated tend to "inflate"
their assessments of how unhappy they will be if incarcerated
350. Dan Markel and Chad Flanders make this point powerfully in Bentham on Stilts, supra
note 1. See also, RAWLS, supra note 205, at 9 ("[I[f some kind of very cruel crime becomes
common, and none of the criminals can be caught, it might be highly expedient, as an example,
to hang an innocent man, if a charge against him could be so framed that he were universally
thought guilty; indeed this would only fail to be an ideal instance of utilitarian 'punishment'
because the victim himself would not have been so likely as a real felon to commit such a crime
in the future; in all other respects it would be perfectly deterrent and therefore felicific.")
(internal citation omitted).
351. See supra Parts I, III.C.3.
352. Bronsteen et al., supra note 1, at 1046-49.
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again.353 Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur suggest that these
phenomena are in tension with traditional theory and current practice
because the deterrent "bang" is all frontloaded and that longer
sentences therefore serve no utilitarian purpose. That view reveals a
key conceptual gap between Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur and
most liberal theorists in the utilitarian tradition.
As a threshold matter, the concept of hedonic adaptation
reveals some rather serious question-begging in the application of
results from self-reporting studies to criminal law and punishment
theory. By definition, the survey data on hedonic adaptation reports
adaptation. That is, it reports responses to changes in condition. The
researchers do not claim that evidence of adaptation or failure to
adapt answers ontological or ethical questions about the nature of the
states of affairs on either side of the shift. That most people do or do
not adapt to a particular condition does not answer the question
whether that condition is good, bad, or neutral, desirable, undesirable,
or barely worthy of mention.
The fact that most incarcerated offenders adapt to prison life
does not mean that prison life is hunky-dory once you get accustomed
to it. We would need to look elsewhere to justify that proposition.
When we do, it is pretty clear that prison life is wholly undesirable in
objective terms. Furthermore, in most relevant ways, prison life is
objectively bad. Evidence of emotional resilience does not change that
fact. What the literature cited by Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur
shows, then, is adaptation to bad circumstances. What they see as
"inflated" assessments of future misery do not reflect inflation at all.
Rather, potential recidivists are simply reporting a point so obvious it
hardly bears stating: that life in prison is much less desirable than life
outside of prison.
While the conclusion is obvious, it exposes a more profound gap
between Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur and the main mass of
liberal theorists in the utilitarian tradition. Bronsteen, Buccafusco,
and Masur's argument endorses a view of human pain and suffering
that is both thin and somewhat demeaning. The point is made
famously by Mill in On Utility in his discussion of "swine." Mill states
clearly his view that "actions are right in proportion as they tend to
promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of
happiness."354 "Happiness" and its "reverse" are not, however,
reducible to raw sensations shared with beasts. It would be "absurd,"
Mill writes, to suppose that "the estimation of pleasure should be
353. Id. at 1058-61.
354. MILL, supra note 56, at 7.
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supposed to depend on quantity alone."355 Rather, "pleasure" for
human beings has a strongly qualitative dimension referring to the
scope of capacities descriptive of the human condition. Thus Mill's
famous dictum that "[iut is better to be a human being dissatisfied
than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool
satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is
because they only know their own side of the question."356
There is a deep and substantial contemporary literature
exploring objective and intersubjective accounts of happiness in
keeping with Mill's fundamental insight. Martha Nussbaum, Amartya
Sen, and Richard Kraut are particularly worthy of note.3 5 7 As Martha
Nussbaum points out in her work on capabilities, it is quite common
for persons denied rights and opportunities to ignore, discount, or
deny the value of those dimensions of experience and pleasure. 358 That
does not make those experiences and capabilities less valuable,
however. Destitute and exploited persons the world over find pleasure
and happiness in small comforts, but that does not mean that their
lives would not be substantially better if they enjoyed bodily security,
basic material provisions, education, freedom of expression, etc.3 59
That would be true even if they adapted quickly to those new
conditions, and returned to the same baseline of happiness they had
when poor and oppressed. Kraut agrees, pointing out that access and
opportunity to explore the breadth of human capacities provides the
best definition we can have of human good as "flourishing."3 60
While these views might strike some as elitist, most such
criticisms indulge a core mistake, miss the point, or both. 361 The claim
is not that one cannot report happiness if one never makes more than
$30,000 a year. The claim is not even that reports of happiness by
those who make less than $30,000 are not to be believed. The claim is
most certainly not, as Kolber would have it, that those who make
$30,000 a year have less liberty than those who make $100,000.
Rather, the point is that the possibilities of what one can do in life
expand and increase if you make $100,000 a year rather than $30,000.
For that reason, most people would rather have the extra $70,000 a
355. Id. at 8.
356. Id. at 10. But see HERMAN MELVILLE, TYPEE: A PEEP AT POLYNESIAN LIFE 178-83 (John
Bryant ed., Penguin Books 1996) (1846).
357. See, e.g., KRAUT, supra note 31; AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 225-317 (Harvard
Univ. Press 2009); Nussbaum, Capabilities, supra note 31; Nussbaum, supra note 30.
358. See, e.g., Nussbaum, Capabilities, supra note 31.
359. See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS supra note 31.
360. KRAUT, supra note 31, at 131.
361. See, e.g., MILL, supra note 56, at 8-10 (discussing an example of a criticism).
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year. Similarly, if you never learn French, travel to Istanbul, read
Proust, come to understand John Cage, or develop the vocabulary of
an oenophile, that does not mean that you cannot be truly happy; but
it does mean that your life will lack the dimensionality provided by
those capacities and experiences.
What is on the vast list of possibilities that constitutes the good
life varies by the person, of course, but most people when given a
series of "what if's" will agree that, even though they are perfectly
happy now, they would prefer a life with some of those things,
experiences, or abilities. And that, of course, is the crucial bit:
choice. 362 Even if one chooses to live in a small room for twenty-three
hours a day with little substantial human contact doing nothing more
than staring at the walls,363 it is by far better to choose it than to have
it forced upon you. 364 This point is missed by Bronsteen, Buccafusco,
and Masur, and it remains true even if the choice has little impact on
self-reported happiness.
Humans are a remarkably resilient species. A prisoner may
therefore adapt to his surroundings by reducing his expectations and
focusing on small pleasures. Upon release, he can afford to set aside
the emotional structures of his adaptation, free now to pursue the
expanded pleasures afforded by greater freedom. What Bronsteen,
Buccafusco, and Masur regard as "inflation" in assessments of future
misery is, on this view, nothing more than a fully rational and
objective assessment of two very different environments. Happiness in
prison is just incommensurate with happiness outside of prison. Any
doubts on this point are quickly erased with a couple of rhetorical
questions: Would you rather be in prison or not? Would your answer
change if you were told that, in answer to a blunt questionnaire, 365 you
would report levels of happiness during your incarceration identical to
those you report now?366
362. E.g., Nussbaum, supra note 30, at 99-103.
363. Academics, for example.
364. See, e.g., THE STATLER BROTHERS, Flowers on the Wall, on FLOWERS ON THE WALL
(Columbia Records 1965) ("Countin' flowers on the wall/That don't bother me at all/Playin'
solitaire till dawn with a deck of fifty-one/Smokin' cigarettes and watchin' Captain
Kangaroo/Now don't tell me I've nothin' to do.").
365. Nussbaum, supra note 30, at 86-88.
366. The literature is rife with more profound questions ranging from Robert Nozick's ethical
turn on brain-in-a-vat problems to challenges posed by cultural relativists, which are topics for
late-night dorm conversations at universities and colleges the world over. It is beyond the scope
of this Article to take up those discussions, but the fact that they can be had comes close to
proving that the point apparently is lost on Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, who attempt to
draw normative conclusions from the literature on hedonic adaptation. Bronsteen et al., supra
note 1, at 1049-55.
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In closing this discussion of utilitarianism, one additional
phenomenon is worth brief note. Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur
cite evidence suggesting that offenders experience continuing
hardship upon release from prison and that these hardships are more
difficult to bear and adapt to than constraints imposed by prison
life. 36 7 To the extent this is an argument for greater attention to
reentry issues in the criminal justice system, this author has no
objection-quite to the contrary. 368 In agreeing, however, it is
important to take note of the fact that Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and
Masur appear to have missed the descriptive and normative
significance of the phenomenon to which they refer.
Just as there is a normative distinction between crime and
punishment, so too is there a normative and an experiential difference
between hard structural constraints and socially constructed
restraints. Limits on the pursuit of happiness imposed by
incarceration are, while difficult to bear, essentially physical truths.
Limits on happiness imposed by socially constructed status
inequalities are just different in kind. Imprisonment imposed by a
well-functioning legal system in cases where an actual crime has been
committed have at least a veneer of justice. Social discrimination is,
by contrast, often arbitrary, unfair, and undeserved. The disparities in
adaptability and reported happiness between offenders in prison and
those who are shunned upon release therefore may reflect prisoners'
internalizing the very moral sensibilities which much of the
subjectivist critique rejects. That is to say, ex-convicts subjected to
undeserved discrimination and harm are persistently unhappy
because they are subjected to undeserved harm and quite rightly
resent it.
VI. CONCLUSION: WHY SUFFERING MATTERS
In battles over definitions, there is a danger that, out of
"concern to assign the right labels to the things men do, [we] lose all
interest in asking whether men are doing the right things."369 In
picking an unnecessary and ultimately unfruitful fight with
traditional theories of punishment over the definition of "punishment,"
contemporary subjectivists are at risk of missing the very significant
opportunities their insights offer in our ongoing efforts to "do the right
thing." The observations of subjective experiences offered by these
367. Id.
368. See supra note 102.
369. Fuller, supra note 324, at 643.
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scholars are not trivial just because they do not pose intractable
objections to traditional theories of criminal punishment. There is no
doubt that suffering matters. For example, judges and executive-
branch officials routinely entertain pleas for mercy from prisoners who
have suffered inordinately during their incarceration.3 70 Kant, for one,
has acknowledged the justice of such practices, noting with approval
the authority of executives to grant clemency. 371
Where clemency is granted in the face of significant incidental
suffering, one might expect to hear phrases like "he has been punished
enough," but the point made by objectivists is that this common
parlance obfuscates rather than reveals underlying justifications and
measures of punishment. So, while excessive suffering at the hands of
other prisoners, say, may well provide good reason for early release
from a justly imposed term of imprisonment, the objectivist position is
that it is not necessary, justified, advisable, or coherent, to convert
this sort of incidental suffering into "punishment" in order to justify
that early release. Rather, mercy and other important principles
within the penumbra of justice are sufficient and better guides.
A similar case for relevance of suffering can be made for the
practicalities of penal method. Any punishment is bound to produce
some degree of incidental suffering. In some instances, a particular
technology may consistently produce incidental suffering beyond an
acceptable or remediable threshold. In those cases, prudence may
provide normative ground for abandoning or altering the practice. For
example, several litigants in recent years have raised concerns that
techniques used to carry out the death penalty may inflict excessive
incidental pain and suffering. 372 These arguments have the best hope
of success if the suffering at issue is characterized as incidental, and
therefore worthy of remediation, than they would if proponents argued
that this unnecessary incidental pain was part of the "punishment."373
To return to a favorite example of Kolber's, if a severe
claustrophobic is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and the
standard cell size is so small that his claustrophobia will cause him to
suffer mind-crushing distress, then there is little question that prison
officials should provide some reasonable remedy. However, the case
for that remedy is based not on the fact that his terror is punishment,
370. Sentencing Memorandum at 14-15, Simon v. United States, No. CR-90-216 (E.D.N.Y.
March 17, 2005), available at http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/pub/rulings/cr/2005/90cr216sm
31705.pdf.
371. KANT, supra note 14, at 107-08.
372. See, e.g., Cooey v. Strickland, 589 F.3d 210, 215 (6th Cir. 2009); Emmett v. Johnson, 532
F.3d 291, 292-93 (4th Cir. 2008); Hamilton v. Jones, 472 F.3d 814, 816-17 (10th Cir. 2007).
373. See supra note 274.
1692 [Vol. 63:6:1619
PUNISHMENT AS SUFFERING
but rather on the fact that it is not. That, in the end, is the
fundamental point of disagreement between objectivists and
contemporary subjectivists. Objectivists think that the
claustrophobic's distress matters because it is not punishment.
Contemporary subjectivists think that the claustrophobic's distress
matters because it is punishment. Contemporary subjectivists think
that sexual assault in prison matters because it is punishment.
Objectivists think that it matters, that we have a duty to stop it, and
that we therefore have an obligation to provide some remedy when it
does occur, because sexual assault in prison is not punishment. I think
that the objectivist's view is by far the more coherent and attractive of
the two.
To the incautious reader, these may seem like tremendous
concessions. It is certainly true that there may not be much practical
distance between some results suggested by contemporary
subjectivists and those reached by proper application of traditional
punishment theory and overlapping considerations of mercy and
prudence. 374 However, as in most conversations about law and
morality the "why" is at least as important as the "what." In this
instance, defining punishment independent of suffering and other
subjective experiences of offenders offers the most coherent and
persuasive account of why excessive suffering requires remediation.
The alternative offered by subjectivism and its advocates leaves all
concerned unable to distinguish crime from punishment, conflates a
normative concept with contingent effects, commits officials to
inflicting additional pain and suffering on model prisoners, paints a
shallow and demeaning picture of humans and human potential, and
pushes justice down the "winding path"375 of sadism and perversion.
374. See Gray & Huber, supra note 18 (arguing on retributivist grounds for progressive
changes to American criminal law and punishment policy).
375. KANT, supra note 14, at 105.
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